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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: <= 2.3.0
Patched in 2.4.0
Details
The Django admin views for moderation comments (CollectionCommentAdmin and RequestCommentAdmin) render the full comment body but scope access only by an attacker-controlled id in the URL and Django's model-level view_*comment permission. They perform no per-object participant check. As a result, any authenticated staff user who holds the comment view permission can read the comments of any collection or moderation request — including ones they are not a participant of — simply by supplying the target object's id.
Comments are documented and intended to be private to the participants of a collection (its author and the moderators assigned to its workflow). This advisory concerns a read/write authorization asymmetry: the write paths already enforced request.user == obj.author, but the read paths did not enforce any participant check.
ModerationRequest.user_can_view_comments() — the gate intended to protect comment reads (author or assigned moderator) — existed in the codebase but was never called by the comment admins. Neither CollectionCommentAdmin nor RequestCommentAdmin overrode get_queryset, and their changelist_view / changeform_view methods resolved the target object directly from the user-supplied id without an authorization check.
The changelists are hard-scoped to a single collection / moderation request (they raise Http404 when no id is present), so the exposure is not "all comments at once," but any specific collection's or request's comments can be retrieved by iterating ids.
list_display on both admins includes the comment message, so the full body is disclosed directly in the changelist HTML..../<id>/change/) discloses the same content via a direct URL.view_collectioncomment / view_requestcomment permission. A reviewer of collection A can read the comments of collection B.Restrict the view_collectioncomment and view_requestcomment model permissions to trusted users only, and avoid granting them across teams that must not see each other's moderation comments. This does not fully close the issue but reduces the set of users who can exploit it. Upgrading is the only complete fix.
Upgrade to djangocms-moderation 2.4.1.
The fix adds a user_can_view_comments participant gate (author or assigned moderator) to both comment admins, enforced in changelist_view and changeform_view for both the collection and request comment models. A ModerationCollection.user_can_view_comments() method was added to mirror the existing ModerationRequest.user_can_view_comments(). Non-participants now receive an HTTP 403 (PermissionDenied).
Reported via coordinated disclosure.
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.20%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 9.9% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 11/19/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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