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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: < 0.55.0
Patched in 0.55.0
Details
Gortex is an MCP server exposing write_file, edit_file, and move_inline tools. resolveFilePath exempts absolute paths from confinement, and the write handlers — unlike read_file / get_symbol_source — never call guardSymlinkWithinRepo. A single MCP write_file call with an absolute path writes any file the daemon user can, outside every indexed repo root (AtomicWriteFile's MkdirAll auto-creates missing parents). Writing ~/.zshrc, ~/.bashrc, .git/hooks/pre-commit, or a cron/systemd unit yields code execution on the next shell/commit. This directly violates the project's own SECURITY.md invariant "File-path resolution is confined to indexed repository roots"
internal/mcp/tools_fileops.go (+ tools_move_inline.go), HEAD 28fa017 (v0.53.0).
CWE-22 (Path Traversal) / CWE-73 (External Control of File Name/Path) → CWE-94 (code execution).
internal/mcp/tools_fileops.go:54-62 resolveFilePath exempts absolute paths from the repo-root confinement; the write sink at :793 (AtomicWriteFile, write_file) and :676 (edit_file) run with no guardSymlinkWithinRepo. The asymmetry is the bug: read_file (:940) and get_symbol_source do call guardSymlinkWithinRepo; the write path does not.
The PoC (internal/mcp/poc_arbitrary_write_test.go, package mcp) builds the server via the repo's own newSingleRepoServer(t) harness and invokes the real srv.handleWriteFile through the genuine mcplib.CallToolRequest shape:
=== RUN TestPoC_ArbitraryWrite_AbsolutePathEscapesEveryRepoRoot
indexed repo root (confinement boundary): /var/folders/.../myrepo
handler status=created path=/var/folders/.../003/pwn.txt bytes_written=50
PROOF: /var/folders/.../003/pwn.txt now exists with attacker bytes "OWNED-by-gortex-write_file-outside-every-repo-root"
RCE-PATH PROOF: wrote /var/folders/.../004/victim-home/.zshrc (parent dir auto-created) -> "echo PWNED_BY_GORTEX_RCE # injected via write_file"
VIOLATION of SECURITY.md line 17 ("It does not write to source files")
--- PASS (go test ok)
The test asserts the handler did not return IsError and that the files exist outside every repo root. (Full PoC available on request.)
write_file / edit_file are MCP tools driven by an LLM agent. A prompt-injected or adversarial agent (the standard MCP threat model) writes any file the daemon user can — startup/hook/cron files → arbitrary code execution on the host running the daemon. Confinement (the security property SECURITY.md promises) is broken on the write path.
High — CVSS v3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N ≈ 8.x. UI:R reflects that a tool call must be elicited from the agent (standard MCP injected-tool model). The RCE is a chain (write a startup/hook file → execute on next trigger), so I:H + the code-execution path. Floor: if the deployment never exposes write tools to untrusted input, impact is lower — but the tool is shipped and the confinement guard is simply absent on the write path.
Apply guardSymlinkWithinRepo (and reject absolute paths outside the indexed roots) on write_file / edit_file / move_inline, identically to read_file / get_symbol_source. Confinement must cover the write path.
gh api repos/zzet/gortex/security-advisories → [] (none). gh search prs/issues for resolveFilePath / guardSymlinkWithinRepo / symlink / traversal / confinement → 0 (re-verified 2026-06-27; recent merges #175-#183 touch indexer/persistence, not the write path). resolveFilePath / guardSymlinkWithinRepo are gortex-own code (not vendored). Fresh at HEAD 28fa017.
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.15%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 4.7% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 11/19/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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