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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: <= 1.2.3
Patched in 1.2.4
Details
termux-sync restore trusts fields inside an untrusted backup manifest and uses them as the extraction destination without validation.
During restore, each archive entry is handled as:
src_dir = Path(info.get("source", ...)).parent extract_archive(archive, src_dir, ...)
extract_archive opens the archive and runs tarfile.extract for every member with no path jail and no filter:
with tarfile.open(archive_path, "r:*") as tf: for member in tf.getmembers(): tf.extract(member, dest_path, set_attrs=True)
There is no check that manifest "source" stays under an expected restore root, that tar members stay inside dest_path, or that backup_name used in temporary paths cannot contain ".." or separators.
Impact: A victim who restores a malicious backup (local, shared, or from a compromised GitHub/Google Drive storage backend) can have arbitrary files written anywhere the Termux user can write. Overwriting shell startup files or executable scripts leads to local code execution on later use.
Reproduction (benign markers only):
Expected: restore only writes under fixed, validated roots; reject unsafe source values and members that resolve outside dest. Actual: write destination is fully controlled by manifest.source; proof files and overwrites appear outside any intended jail.
Fix direction:
Actual result (local marker-only reproduction):
PROOF path: /data/data/com.termux/files/home/PWNED_BY_TERMUX_SYNC_RESTORE.txt PROOF exists? True PROOF content: PWNED This file was written by a malicious termux-sync backup restore path. Root cause: manifest files.*.source controls extract destination.
*** VULN CONFIRMED: arbitrary write to $HOME ***
important.conf => secret=ATTACKER_CONTROLLED *** VULN CONFIRMED: overwrite under attacker-chosen root ***
.bashrc_sim shows injected: export ATTACKER=1 *** VULN CONFIRMED: startup-file style overwrite ***
Extract roots used: home -> parent($HOME/dummy_for_parent) = $HOME config -> parent(.../victim_sim/nested_dummy) = .../victim_sim
Reported and credited to Niranj R Mahaswar ( GitHub: @NiranjMahaswar )
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