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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: <= 4.6.1
Patched in 4.6.2
Details
Two effects, sharing the root cause of Advisory 1 — header names chosen by the sender were resolved through Python attribute lookup and rewritten before lookup.
Uncaught exceptions. A crafted message raises an exception that is outside the
MailParser* hierarchy, so a caller catching only mail-parser exceptions does not catch it
and the worker dies.
Header named after a method (CWE-248, reported by @iam-niranjan). Python resolves real
class attributes before __getattr__, so a header named after a method put a bound method
object into the parsed mail dict. A 12-byte email is sufficient. Nine colliding names were
confirmed: Parse, Message, Write_Attachments, From_File, From_File_Obj,
From_File_Msg, From_String, From_Bytes, Get_Server_Ipaddress. Also reproducible from
the CLI (mail-parser -f evil.eml -j).
import mailparser
mailparser.parse_from_string("Parse: x\r\n\r\n").mail_json
# 4.6.1 -> TypeError: Object of type method is not JSON serializable
# 4.6.2 -> {"parse": "x", "has_defects": false}
Header carrying 8-bit bytes (CWE-248). For a header containing raw 8-bit bytes, Python's
compat32 policy returns an email.header.Header rather than a str, which the _raw
accessor passed straight to json.dumps. This fires on entirely benign non-ASCII mail via
parse_from_bytes(), the normal entry point for mail off the wire.
import mailparser
mailparser.parse_from_bytes(b"Subject: caf\xe9\r\n\r\nbody\r\n").subject_raw
# 4.6.1 -> TypeError: Object of type Header is not JSON serializable
# 4.6.2 -> '["caf�"]'
Silent loss of message content (CWE-436). A sender can make a header's value vanish from
every output surface, or be replaced by a different header's value, with has_defects
remaining false. This is an evasion primitive: the tool's output diverges from the bytes
actually in the message, and a pipeline scanning parsed output for indicators sees nothing
and no failure signal.
Header names were normalised before lookup — underscores folded to dashes, and _json /
_raw suffixes interpreted — so a header genuinely named Subject_json was reported with
the value of Subject and its own value discarded, and any header whose name contains an
underscore resolved to nothing.
import mailparser
raw = ("From: Real Sender <[email protected]>\r\n"
"Subject: innocuous\r\n"
"Subject_json: MALWARE-C2 http://evil.example/payload.exe\r\n"
"X_Spam_Flag: YES\r\n\r\nbody\r\n")
mail = mailparser.parse_from_string(raw)
print(mail.mail["subject_json"]) # 4.6.1 -> '"innocuous"' 4.6.2 -> the real value
print(mail.headers["X_Spam_Flag"]) # 4.6.1 -> '' 4.6.2 -> 'YES'
print("MALWARE-C2" in mail.mail_json) # 4.6.1 -> False 4.6.2 -> True
print(mail.has_defects) # both -> False
A related case: email.message.Message.__len__ returns the header count, so a message with
no headers is falsy. parse() returned before initialising state, and the unset
attributes were then absorbed by __getattr__ and answered as absent headers. Every
property returned '' — including mail and attachments, which are documented to return
a dict and a list — with no error and no defect flag.
import mailparser
mail = mailparser.parse_from_string("Click http://evil.example/pay.exe now\r\n")
print(repr(mail.body)) # 4.6.1 -> '' 4.6.2 -> the text
print(repr(mail.attachments)) # 4.6.1 -> '' 4.6.2 -> []
print(mail.has_defects) # 4.6.1 -> '' 4.6.2 -> True
Fixed in 4.6.2. Upgrade with pip install --upgrade mail-parser.
Header names taken from a message are now looked up literally — no attribute access, no
case or separator folding, no suffix interpretation — so no header name can collide with a
method or property, and no value can be substituted or dropped. 8-bit values are coerced to
str before serialisation. Parser state is initialised before the message check, which now
tests is None, and attribute names beginning with _ raise AttributeError instead of
being answered as headers.
Behaviour changes. Header names now appear in mail and headers exactly as sent, so a
header named X_Spam_Flag keeps that name and its own value. X_raw always returns a JSON
array — an absent header yields [] where 4.6.1 returned null.
None for the data loss. For the uncaught exceptions, callers who cannot upgrade should wrap
mail_json, mail_partial_json, headers_json and any X_raw access in a bare
except Exception rather than catching only MailParserError subclasses.
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.36%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 29.7% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 11/18/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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