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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: >= 2.0.0, < 2.1.0
Patched in 2.1.0
Details
parseServerSignature in the v1 module only initializes ServerSignatureVerificationData.Extra inside the if err == nil branch after url.ParseQuery(parsedPayload.VerificationData). Go's url.ParseQuery returns the successfully-parsed pairs together with a non-nil error when the query string contains a malformed percent-escape. A subsequent loop unconditionally writes unknown keys into Extra, regardless of err, causing a nil-map write panic (assignment to entry in nil map) whenever an attacker supplies a VerificationData string with a bad %-escape (e.g. x=1&%zz=2).
This is reachable pre-authentication: parseServerSignature is called by the exported VerifyServerSignature / VerifyServerSignatureSafe before any HMAC/signature check, and VerificationData is attacker-controlled data forwarded by the client as part of the ALTCHA server-signature payload.
Any application calling VerifyServerSignature or VerifyServerSignatureSafe on unauthenticated input can be made to panic by submitting a crafted payload. Under standard net/http, the per-request goroutine panic is recovered and the request aborts (a log-flood / per-request DoS); it escalates to a full process crash if verification runs in an application-spawned goroutine or a non-recovering framework.
payload, _ := json.Marshal(ServerSignaturePayload{
Algorithm: SHA256,
VerificationData: "x=1&%zz=2",
Signature: "irrelevant",
Verified: true,
})
encoded := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(payload)
VerifyServerSignature(encoded, "some-secret") // panics: assignment to entry in nil map
Extra is now initialized unconditionally before the url.ParseQuery error check, so it's always safe to write into regardless of parse errors.
Recover from panics around calls to VerifyServerSignature/VerifyServerSignatureSafe, or reject/sanitize VerificationData before calling them, until upgrading.
Patch commit: 2c4fc27
Reported by Arpit Jain (@arpitjain099) via private disclosure.
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