
Loading

Loading
We use strictly necessary cookies to run this site, and analytics cookies to understand how it's used. See our Privacy Policy for details.
A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: <= 0.1.0
Details
axon rtk-install downloads a pre-built rtkx binary from GitHub releases and executes it via subprocess.run() on every text-compression call, without verifying its integrity — no checksum, signature, or attestation check anywhere in the download/install path. If the release pipeline or a maintainer token for sammyjdev/rtkx were ever compromised, every axon user who installs or auto-bootstraps rtkx would silently download and execute an unverified binary with the same privileges as the axon process.
The download path lives in src/axon/context/rtk_bootstrap.py:
The binary is not dead code — it's on the active execution path. src/axon/context/rtk.py::rtk_binary_path() resolves to the bootstrapped binary at ~/.axon/bin/rtkx, and compress_text_with_rtk() invokes it directly:
result = subprocess.run( [path, "read", str(tmp_path)], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout_seconds, )
This is a missing-control finding rather than an active exploit, so reproduction is by code audit rather than a live payload:
Clone sammyjdev/axon and open src/axon/context/rtk_bootstrap.py. Confirm _http_download() and _extract_binary() perform no hash/signature check before chmod +x. Trace the call chain: bootstrap_rtkx() → _http_download() → _extract_binary() → rtk_binary_path() (in rtk.py) → subprocess.run() in compress_text_with_rtk(). Optionally demonstrate impact safely: point download_url() / the download callable (already injectable per the module's own docstring, "the download step is injectable so the extraction logic is testable offline") at a local HTTP server serving an attacker-controlled archive, and confirm it gets extracted, chmod +x'd, and executed with no rejection.
Type: CWE-494 (Download of Code Without Integrity Check), leading to potential arbitrary code execution. Who's affected: Any axon user who runs axon rtk-install or triggers auto-bootstrap, if sammyjdev/rtkx's release pipeline or a maintainer's release credentials are ever compromised. Not exploitable today without that precondition, but the missing control removes the last line of defense against a supply-chain compromise of the binary dependency.
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.16%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 4.8% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 11/19/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
More pip advisories
Talk to us about this
Find out whether this dependency (or others like it) is actually reachable in your codebase.
Get help patching, or building dependency-scanning into your pipeline going forward.
A secure code review or supply chain review finds this before an advisory does.