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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: >= 0.3.0, < 0.3.8
Patched in 0.3.8
Details
verify_bundle documents that it verifies "a bundle's DSSE envelope AND each per-claim signature", lists "per-claim signature failure" among its raised errors, and promises that partial verification never surfaces "an authenticated bundle that contains some invalid claims" as success. The code does not do this. The JSON-LD predicate built by JSONLDExporter._claim_node carries no signature material (there is no signatureBundle field on the node), so the verify loop has nothing cryptographic to check per claim. It only re-derives each claim's canonical-statement digest from the node fields and compares it to the signed subject list:
chain_input = _signing.canonical_statement({...node fields...}, node.get("evidence") or {})
expected = hashlib.sha256(chain_input).hexdigest()
if subjects[subject_name] != expected:
raise BundleVerificationError(...)
That digest check is self-referential: the exporter signs both the subject digests and the predicate nodes with the same key. It confirms the bundle is internally consistent as built, not that each claim's purported asserter ever validly signed it. The existing test test_tampered_claim_text_in_predicate_fails asserts a "digest mismatch", confirming digest-only verification is the actual contract.
Medium. All trust in a bundle collapses to the single exporter key. Whoever holds it (or a malicious exporter) can emit a bundle containing claims whose asserter signatures are missing, invalid, or forged, and verify_bundle returns success. A relying party reading the docstring believes per-claim authenticity was verified when it was not. Security-sensitive because this is the trust boundary the SCITT-style export exists to provide.
mareforma/export_bundle.py:20 module docstring claims verification checks "every per-claim signature inside predicate"mareforma/export_bundle.py:183 verify_bundle docstring promises per-claim signature verification and a per-claim signature failure errormareforma/export_bundle.py:254 verify loop only recomputes and compares canonical-statement digestsmareforma/exporters/jsonld.py:178 _claim_node emits no signature field, so the predicate carries nothing to verify per claimTwo honest options. Either export each claim's signature bundle in the JSON-LD predicate and have verify_bundle cryptographically verify it (including the claim_id and subject binding) against the claim's asserter or validator key, raising on the first failure as documented. Or, if per-claim verification is out of scope for the bundle format, correct the module docstring and the verify_bundle docstring to state exactly what is verified: the bundle-level DSSE signature plus internal subject-digest consistency, with per-claim asserter signatures explicitly not checked.
Do red/green TDD: add a regression test that fails on main, then make it pass.
SOLID, DRY, KISS. Clean, readable, well-tested code. No new errors, warnings, or test failures; the full suite stays green on all supported Python versions.
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.20%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 10.2% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 11/19/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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