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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: = 0.3.7
Patched in 0.3.8
Details
search_claims never calls _row_verified_on_read. Its row loop applies only the PRELIMINARY-unenrolled filter, then appends the row. query_claims runs the same projection but additionally re-verifies REPLICATED/ESTABLISHED signatures on read (line 4023) and drops any row that fails, per the documented tamper guarantee in the comment block above it: a high-trust row whose signature does not verify is excluded from query results entirely.
So a tampered or forged high-trust row splits the two read paths. Any process with DB write access, or an attacker copying a genuine validation envelope onto a fresh row, can flip a row to ESTABLISHED. query() drops it; search() serves it at its persisted trust level. Verified in a runtime check against a forged ESTABLISHED row:
query() returns forged row: False
search() returns forged row: True # support_level ESTABLISHED, 'verified' key absent
The docstring makes this worse: search_claims promises "the same projection as query_claims" and that the include_unverified filter "applies identically", so callers reasonably trust search results equally. The forged row also lacks the verified key entirely, so a consumer cannot tell it went unchecked.
High. The verify-on-read tamper exclusion is a stated trust guarantee, and search is a primary read surface. A forged ESTABLISHED finding that query correctly rejects is served by search as genuine, with no marker that verification was skipped.
mareforma/db/core.py:4206 search_claims row loop applies only the PRELIMINARY-unenrolled filter, then appendsmareforma/db/core.py:4114 search_claims signature and docstring, which claims query_claims-identical semanticsmareforma/db/core.py:4023 query_claims verify-on-read call that search_claims lacksMirror query_claims: add a verify_cache: dict = {} and, inside the search_claims row loop after the include_unverified check, drop rows that fail _row_verified_on_read(conn, d, verify_cache). Since the verify filter can drop rows even when include_unverified=True, remove the single-batch break on include_unverified and keep batching until limit survivors or the FTS5 match-set is exhausted, with the same scan ceiling query_claims uses. Also set single_trust_domain / trust_domain_root on surviving ESTABLISHED rows if the "same projection" promise is to hold.
Do red/green TDD: add a regression test that fails on main, then make it pass.
SOLID, DRY, KISS. Clean, readable, well-tested code. No new errors, warnings, or test failures; the full suite stays green on all supported Python versions.
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.08%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 0.3% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 11/19/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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