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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: >= 1.22.0, < 1.26.0
Patched in 1.26.0
Details
Any HTTP client can bypass Anubis bot protection on the default configuration by adding a single request header. No challenge needs to be solved. Affected versions: v1.22.0 through v1.25.0 (introduced in commit d1d631a, PR #1015)
The root cause is in lib/policy/checker.go, PathChecker.Check():
func (pc *PathChecker) Check(r *http.Request) (bool, error) {
originalUrl := r.Header.Get("X-Original-URI")
if originalUrl != "" {
if pc.regexp.MatchString(originalUrl) {
return true, nil
}
}
if pc.regexp.MatchString(r.URL.Path) {
return true, nil
}
return false, nil
}
The header value comes directly from the client request. The middleware chain never strips it. In reverse proxy mode an attacker fully controls it.
The default policy imports data/common/keep-internet-working.yaml, which contains path-only ALLOW rules with no other conditions:
- name: well-known
path_regex: ^/\.well-known/.*$
action: ALLOW
When X-Original-URI matches one of those regexes, the rule fires as ALLOW and the request is forwarded upstream without any challenge or JWT check.
Normal request, gets challenged:
curl -s https://anubis.techaro.lol/ | grep -o "<title>.*</title>"
Bypass, gets upstream content:
curl -s -H "X-Original-URI: /.well-known/x" https://anubis.techaro.lol/ | grep -o "<title>.*</title>"
The first command returns the Anubis challenge page title. The second returns the real site title directly, with no cookie set and no challenge issued. Verified live against anubis.techaro.lol.
The fix should probably be to strip the header from incoming client requests in the middleware chain before policy evaluation. In auth_request mode the header is set by the proxy after Anubis processes the middleware, so stripping it at ingress does not break that deployment mode.
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.34%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 27.8% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 11/17/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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