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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: < 0.0.0-20260908095235-eb7875f0a849
Patched in 0.0.0-20260908095235-eb7875f0a849
Details
qbee-agent contains a Zip Slip vulnerability in app/utils/tar.go. The tar extractor checks whether an entry remains inside the destination directory with:
strings.HasPrefix(targetPath, destdirClean)
This does not enforce a path separator boundary. If the destination directory is /tmp/.../context, a tar entry such as ../context-outside/payload.txt cleans to /tmp/.../context-outside/payload.txt and still passes the prefix check. qbee-agent then creates the outside directory and writes the payload outside the intended extraction root.
The issue is reachable through the Docker Compose build context path when UseContext is enabled.
Code references below were verified against qbee-io/qbee-agent commit:
1d8bdbb7422adb4ca563d3114cbe2817d6ba3581Affected repository:
qbee-io/qbee-agentAffected files:
app/utils/tar.goapp/configuration/bundle_docker_compose.goThe vulnerable extraction code:
app/utils/tar.go:89-93targetPath := filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(destPath, header.Name))
destdirClean := filepath.Clean(destPath)
if !strings.HasPrefix(targetPath, destdirClean) {
return fmt.Errorf("tar entry %s is outside of destination directory %s", targetPath, destdirClean)
}
The file is then created at the accepted targetPath:
app/utils/tar.go:96-109case tar.TypeDir:
if err := os.MkdirAll(targetPath, 0755); err != nil {
return err
}
case tar.TypeReg:
targetFile, err := os.Create(targetPath)
Docker Compose build contexts reach this extractor:
app/configuration/bundle_docker_compose.go:238-270The context archive is downloaded and then unpacked into the compose project context directory with utils.UnpackTar.
Archive source and role evidence:
app/configuration/compose.go:14 defines the Docker Compose build context as the remote configuration field Context string.app/configuration/compose.go:26 enables this path with UseContext.app/configuration/file_manager.go:240-246 and app/configuration/file_manager.go:281-287 show that context sources are resolved either from file:// local files or from the Qbee file-manager API.configuration:manage from files:manage, and maps "Configure -> Modify configuration" to configuration:manage while "Files manager -> Write access" maps to files:manage: https://docs.qbee.io/account-users-and-roles.htmlTrust-boundary requirement:
Two failing regression tests add.
The utility-level test proves the extractor bug directly:
app/utils/tar_test.go:132Test_TarZipSlipSiblingPrefixBypassCommand:
wsl -e sh -lc 'cd /mnt/c/Users/kwak0/Documents/Qbee/targets/qbee-agent; /mnt/c/Users/kwak0/Documents/Qbee/.tools/go1.26.4-linux/go/bin/go test ./app/utils -run Test_TarZipSlipSiblingPrefixBypass -count=1 -v'
Observed result:
=== RUN Test_TarZipSlipSiblingPrefixBypass
tar_test.go:169: expected unpackTar to reject sibling-prefix traversal archive
tar_test.go:174: path traversal: payload was written outside destPath at /tmp/.../context-outside/payload.txt; got "zip-slip-sibling-prefix"
--- FAIL: Test_TarZipSlipSiblingPrefixBypass (0.00s)
FAIL
The Docker Compose bundle-path test proves reachability through Compose.getContext():
app/configuration/bundle_docker_compose_context_zip_slip_test.go:13Test_ComposeContextRejectsSiblingPrefixZipSlipCommand:
wsl -e sh -lc 'cd /mnt/c/Users/kwak0/Documents/Qbee/targets/qbee-agent; /mnt/c/Users/kwak0/Documents/Qbee/.tools/go1.26.4-linux/go/bin/go test ./app/configuration -run Test_ComposeContextRejectsSiblingPrefixZipSlip -count=1 -v'
Observed result:
=== RUN Test_ComposeContextRejectsSiblingPrefixZipSlip
bundle_docker_compose_context_zip_slip_test.go:66: expected compose context unpack to reject sibling-prefix traversal archive
bundle_docker_compose_context_zip_slip_test.go:75: compose context path traversal wrote outside context dir at /tmp/.../cache/docker_compose/project-a/context-outside/payload.txt; got "compose-context-zip-slip"
--- FAIL: Test_ComposeContextRejectsSiblingPrefixZipSlip (0.00s)
FAIL
An attacker-controlled Docker Compose build context archive can create directories and regular files outside qbee-agent's intended context extraction directory, with qbee-agent process privileges.
The demonstrated impact is constrained path traversal:
cache/docker_compose/<project>/context-outside/payload.txt./etc/passwd; those do not pass the current string-prefix check.This report does not claim direct RCE.
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