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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: < 2.12.12
Patched in 2.12.12
Vulnerable: >= 2.14.0-RC.1, < 2.14.3
Patched in 2.14.3
Details
NATS.io is a high performance open source pub-sub distributed communication technology, built for the cloud, on-premise, IoT and edge computing.
The NATS Server MQTT support includes retained messages and QoS1+ durable delivery. NATS subscription permissions can allow broad wildcard subscriptions while denying more sensitive subjects.
MQTT retained message delivery and QoS1+ durable replay could deliver messages whose original topics matched a subscriber's configured subscribe deny rules.
Normal live delivery applied the delivery-time deny check. These MQTT delivery paths did not consistently recheck the concrete original topic before sending the MQTT PUBLISH to the subscriber.
The issue affects MQTT subscribers with broad wildcard subscribe permissions where more specific topics are denied. Normal live delivery can be blocked while retained or replayed delivery still sends the denied topic.
Versions v2.14.2, v2.12.11 and below are vulnerable. The issue is fixed in v2.14.3 and v2.12.12.
No known workaround for deployments that require MQTT. Upgrade to a fixed release. Deployments not using MQTT are not affected.
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.34%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 28.3% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 11/20/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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