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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: >= 4.0.0, < 4.6.4
Patched in 4.6.4
Vulnerable: >= 3.0.0, < 4.0.0
Vulnerable: >= 4.0.0, < 4.6.4
Patched in 4.6.4
Vulnerable: >= 3.12.2, < 4.0.0
Details
When using the webpack or rspack builder, the dev server serves built client chunks to any request whose Host header matches its Origin/Referer, or that carries Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin. After a DNS rebinding attack both headers name the attacker's hostname, so a malicious page opened while nuxt dev is running can read /_nuxt/*.js and exfiltrate the app's source. This bypasses the same-origin check added for GHSA-4gf7-ff8x-hq99, GHSA-6m52-m754-pw2g and GHSA-x6qj-4h56-5rj5.
A developer runs nuxt dev with builder: 'webpack' or builder: 'rspack' (the default config is enough; --host is not required) and opens a page on an attacker-controlled hostname, for example http://rebind.attacker.example:3000/. The attacker then re-points that hostname at 127.0.0.1. Requests from the page now reach the dev server as same-origin requests:
curl -H 'Host: rebind.attacker.example:3000' -H 'Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin' http://127.0.0.1:3000/_nuxt/app.js
# 200, with the compiled modules
The page can read the response with fetch, which exposes the compiled source and its inline source maps, module identifiers, the developer's local filesystem paths, and any developer-controlled values inlined into the client bundle (for example through a custom DefinePlugin). With rspack, the HMR websocket also accepts connections from the rebound hostname. Private runtimeConfig is not part of the client bundle.
The attacker needs to know or guess the dev server port and to time the DNS change. Chrome 142+ and other Chromium-based browsers that enforce Local Network Access restrictions prompt before a public page can reach a loopback address.
The default Vite builder is not affected: Vite rejects unknown Host headers through server.allowedHosts. Production builds are not affected.
Fixed in @nuxt/webpack-builder 4.6.4 and @nuxt/rspack-builder 4.6.4. The dev middleware now rejects requests whose Host header is not localhost, *.localhost, an IP address, or a hostname allowed by the new devServer.allowedHosts option or by vite.server.allowedHosts, before any Sec-Fetch-Site/Origin/Referer checks. This includes devServer.host and the hosts nuxt dev allows for the addresses it listens on; nuxt dev --public allows any host, as it does with Vite. With rspack, the same list is passed to rsbuild's server.allowedHosts, which covers the HMR websocket.
When accessing the dev server through another hostname, for example through a reverse proxy, add that hostname to devServer.allowedHosts (a leading . also allows subdomains; true allows any host).
Nuxt 3 has reached end of life and will not receive a fix.
Nuxt thanks Anthropic for reporting this through coordinated disclosure (ANT-2026-VKRM97G5).
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.14%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 3.1% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 11/16/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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