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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: >= 4.4.6, < 4.6.4
Patched in 4.6.4
Vulnerable: >= 3.21.6, < 4.0.0
Vulnerable: >= 4.4.6, < 4.6.4
Patched in 4.6.4
Vulnerable: >= 3.21.6, < 4.0.0
Details
The fix for CVE-2026-46342 (GHSA-g8wj-3cr3-6w7v) binds each /__nuxt_island/<Name>_<hash>.json path to its props by hashing the (name, props, context, source) tuple. That hash was computed over ohash's serialization, which does not escape quotes inside strings or delimiters inside keys, so two different prop objects can produce the same hash. A request with crafted props can therefore pass validation for another island's path and render different content at that path.
For example, these two prop objects serialize identically and share one island path:
{ html: '', note: '<img src=x onerror="alert(1)">' }
{ html: '\',note:\'<img src=x onerror="alert(1)">' }
This reopens the scenarios described in GHSA-g8wj-3cr3-6w7v:
nuxt generate / prerendering. Nuxt caches prerendered island responses by path. If the crawler reaches a link to the colliding URL (for example in user-submitted content included in the build) before it renders the page that uses the legitimate props, the colliding response is written into the generated page./__nuxt_island/* by path only, ignoring the query, can be primed with the colliding response.An attacker has to construct props that collide with a specific legitimate tuple, which in practice means at least part of that tuple is a string they control (for example a stored comment or profile field passed as a prop). Where a prop reaches an unsafe HTML sink in the island (v-html, innerHTML, a renderer treating a prop as HTML), the substituted response can execute script in the site's origin. Without such a sink, the impact is content substitution.
Applications are not affected if they do not use server components or <NuxtIsland>, or if no island receives attacker-influenced string props. Server-rendered responses that are not cached by path alone are also unaffected.
Fixed in [email protected] and @nuxt/[email protected]. The island hash is now computed over a canonical JSON encoding of the tuple, in which strings and keys are escaped, so different props can no longer produce the same hash.
Island hashes change as a result. Clients that build island URLs themselves should use the exported getIslandHash rather than hashing with ohash directly.
Nuxt 3 has reached end of life and will not receive a fix. Upgrade to Nuxt 4.
/__nuxt_island/* on the full query string, not on the path alone.v-html or other HTML sinks without sanitisation./__nuxt_island/ in crawled pages, for example by excluding that prefix with nitro.prerender.ignore:export default defineNuxtConfig({
nitro: {
prerender: {
ignore: [route => route.startsWith('/__nuxt_island/') && route.includes('?')],
},
},
})
Thanks to rat5ak for reporting this issue.
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.12%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 1.7% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 11/16/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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