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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: >= 7.15.0, < 7.30.1
Patched in 7.30.1
Vulnerable: >= 8.0.0, < 8.12.2
Patched in 8.12.2
Details
undici's decompress interceptor forwards decompressed response data to the downstream handler from zlib stream event callbacks without catching exceptions those callbacks may throw. undici's engine converts a synchronous throw from a downstream handler into a per-request failure, but that protection is not in place when the throw happens asynchronously from a zlib callback. As a result, a downstream handler that throws by design, for example the built-in dump interceptor which throws when a response exceeds its maxSize, escapes as an uncaught exception and terminates the Node.js process.
A malicious or compromised HTTP server can crash any client that composes the decompress interceptor with dump (or another response handler that throws), by returning a small compressed body that decompresses to more than the configured limit. The compressed bytes on the wire are tiny, so only the decompressed size matters. If the application keeps the process alive with a global uncaught-exception handler, the affected request instead hangs until the body timeout.
Upgrade to undici 7.30.1 or 8.12.2.
Avoid composing the decompress interceptor with a response handler that throws during response processing (such as dump with a maxSize) until upgrading.
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.26%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 17.7% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 10/27/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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