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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: < 2.4.7
Patched in 2.4.7
Vulnerable: >= 3.0.0, < 3.1.8
Patched in 3.1.8
Vulnerable: >= 4.0.0, < 4.1.5
Patched in 4.1.5
Details
fast-uri folds the host to lowercase before it percent-decodes the host, so a percent-encoded uppercase unreserved octet such as %41 decodes to a literal A that is never folded. For a scheme-relative reference (//host) there is no scheme, so the host canonicalization that repairs this on a scheme-bearing URL does not run. As a result parse, normalize, and equal disagree on the same host: parse("//%41.com").host returns "A.com" while parse("//a.com").host and parse("//A.com").host return "a.com", and equal("//%41.com", "//a.com") is false even though equal("//A.com", "//a.com") is true. An application that makes a case-sensitive host decision on fast-uri output for a scheme-relative reference, for example a host allowlist or denylist that compares parse(url).host or uses fast-uri.equal, can be steered past the check with a percent-encoded uppercase octet. Because a hostname is case-insensitive in DNS and HTTP routing, the evading spelling reaches the same host the check meant to gate, so the effect is check evasion rather than reaching a different registrable host.
Upgrade to fast-uri 4.1.5, 3.1.8, or 2.4.7.
Compare hosts case-insensitively (lowercase the parsed host before any allowlist or denylist decision), or avoid making case-sensitive host decisions on scheme-relative input until upgrading.
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.25%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 16.9% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 11/14/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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