
Loading

Loading
We use strictly necessary cookies to run this site, and analytics cookies to understand how it's used. See our Privacy Policy for details.
A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: >= 4.0.0, < 4.3.1
Patched in 4.3.1
Vulnerable: >= 3.0.0, < 3.30.15
Patched in 3.30.15
Details
The JLine3 built-in grep command wraps the user-supplied regular expression with
.* before compiling it with Java's backtracking regex engine. This amplifies
catastrophic backtracking and allows a short pattern such as (a+)+b to hang the
command thread on non-matching input. In environments that expose the JLine shell to
remote users, this is a denial-of-service issue.
In builtins/src/main/java/org/jline/builtins/PosixCommands.java, the grep
implementation rewrites the user pattern before compilation:
String regex = args.remove(0);
String regexp = regex;
if (opt.isSet("word-regexp")) {
regexp = "\\b" + regexp + "\\b";
}
if (opt.isSet("line-regexp")) {
regexp = "^" + regexp + "$";
} else {
regexp = ".*" + regexp + ".*";
}
The transformed pattern is compiled with Pattern.compile(...) and then used to test
each input line. For a payload such as (a+)+b, the automatic .* prefix and suffix
increase the backtracking search space substantially.
Affected source location:
builtins/src/main/java/org/jline/builtins/PosixCommands.javagrep(...)a characters:printf 'aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\n' > /tmp/testfile.txt
grep against that file:grep '(a+)+b' /tmp/testfile.txt
Expected result:
Reproduction environment:
This is a denial-of-service vulnerability caused by catastrophic regex backtracking.
Any application embedding org.jline:jline-builtins and exposing the built-in grep
command is impacted. In remote shell deployments, an attacker can occupy a worker
thread indefinitely and repeat the attack across multiple sessions to reduce service
availability for other users.
The preferred fix for the current git head is:
.*...*Matcher.find() for substring semanticsSuggested patch:
diff --git a/builtins/pom.xml b/builtins/pom.xml
--- a/builtins/pom.xml
+++ b/builtins/pom.xml
@@
<dependency>
+ <groupId>com.google.re2j</groupId>
+ <artifactId>re2j</artifactId>
+ <version>1.8</version>
+ </dependency>
+ <dependency>
<groupId>org.jline</groupId>
<artifactId>jline-reader</artifactId>
</dependency>
diff --git a/builtins/src/main/java/org/jline/builtins/PosixCommands.java b/builtins/src/main/java/org/jline/builtins/PosixCommands.java
--- a/builtins/src/main/java/org/jline/builtins/PosixCommands.java
+++ b/builtins/src/main/java/org/jline/builtins/PosixCommands.java
@@
-import java.util.regex.Pattern;
+import com.google.re2j.Pattern;
@@
if (opt.isSet("line-regexp")) {
regexp = "^" + regexp + "$";
- } else {
- regexp = ".*" + regexp + ".*";
}
@@
- boolean m = p.matcher(line).matches();
+ boolean m = opt.isSet("line-regexp")
+ ? p.matcher(line).matches()
+ : p.matcher(line).find();
This issue was identified by Michał Majchrowicz and Marcin Wyczechowski, members of the AFINE Team.
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.60%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 48.7% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 11/8/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
Talk to us about this
Find out whether this dependency (or others like it) is actually reachable in your codebase.
Get help patching, or building dependency-scanning into your pipeline going forward.
A secure code review or supply chain review finds this before an advisory does.