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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: >= 4.0.0, < 4.3.1
Patched in 4.3.1
Vulnerable: >= 3.0.0, < 3.30.15
Patched in 3.30.15
Details
When regex search mode is enabled in the JLine3 nano editor, the user-supplied
search term is compiled directly as a Java regular expression with no timeout or
backtracking bound. A crafted pattern such as (a+)+b can hang the editor session
thread at high CPU, causing a denial of service for that session.
In builtins/src/main/java/org/jline/builtins/Nano.java, the search implementation
uses Pattern.LITERAL only when regex mode is disabled. When regex mode is enabled,
the search term is compiled as a raw Java regex:
Pattern pat = Pattern.compile(
searchTerm,
(searchCaseSensitive ? 0 : Pattern.CASE_INSENSITIVE | Pattern.UNICODE_CASE)
| (searchRegexp ? 0 : Pattern.LITERAL));
This regex is then applied to buffer content. Because Java's regex engine is backtracking-based, nested-quantifier patterns can take exponential time on non-matching input.
Affected source location:
builtins/src/main/java/org/jline/builtins/Nano.javadoSearch(String text)a characters and open it in the JLine3
nano editor.(a+)+b.Expected result:
Reproduction environment:
This is a denial-of-service vulnerability caused by catastrophic regex backtracking.
Applications embedding org.jline:jline-builtins and exposing the nano editor are
impacted. In local use, the user can hang their own session. In remote multi-user
deployments, an attacker can occupy a server worker thread indefinitely.
The preferred fix for the current git head is to use a linear-time regex engine for regex search mode while preserving literal matching behavior when regex mode is off.
Suggested patch:
diff --git a/builtins/pom.xml b/builtins/pom.xml
--- a/builtins/pom.xml
+++ b/builtins/pom.xml
@@
<dependency>
+ <groupId>com.google.re2j</groupId>
+ <artifactId>re2j</artifactId>
+ <version>1.8</version>
+ </dependency>
+ <dependency>
<groupId>org.jline</groupId>
<artifactId>jline-reader</artifactId>
</dependency>
diff --git a/builtins/src/main/java/org/jline/builtins/Nano.java b/builtins/src/main/java/org/jline/builtins/Nano.java
--- a/builtins/src/main/java/org/jline/builtins/Nano.java
+++ b/builtins/src/main/java/org/jline/builtins/Nano.java
@@
-import java.util.regex.Pattern;
+import com.google.re2j.Pattern;
If a dependency change is not acceptable, a fallback mitigation is to reject dangerous regex constructs or execute regex matching with a strict timeout, but that is weaker than replacing the backtracking engine.
This issue was identified by Michał Majchrowicz and Marcin Wyczechowski, members of the AFINE Team.
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.43%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 37.9% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 11/8/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
Talk to us about this
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A secure code review or supply chain review finds this before an advisory does.