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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: >= 4.0.0, < 4.3.1
Patched in 4.3.1
Vulnerable: >= 3.0.0, < 3.30.15
Patched in 3.30.15
Details
The JLine3 HISTORY_IGNORE variable is converted into a Java regular expression with
only partial escaping. As a result, regex metacharacters other than * and : are
passed through to the regex engine. A crafted value such as (a+)+b can cause
catastrophic backtracking each time a command line is added to history, hanging the
reader thread at high CPU.
In reader/src/main/java/org/jline/reader/impl/history/DefaultHistory.java,
matchPatterns() converts HISTORY_IGNORE into a regex:
for (int i = 0; i < patterns.length(); i++) {
char ch = patterns.charAt(i);
if (ch == '\\') {
ch = patterns.charAt(++i);
sb.append(ch);
} else if (ch == ':') {
sb.append('|');
} else if (ch == '*') {
sb.append('.').append('*');
} else {
sb.append(ch);
}
}
return line.matches(sb.toString());
This logic translates wildcard syntax but does not escape regex metacharacters such as
(, ), +, ?, {, }, [, and ]. Those characters therefore reach the Java
regex engine unchanged.
Affected source location:
reader/src/main/java/org/jline/reader/impl/history/DefaultHistory.javamatchPatterns(String patterns, String line)HISTORY_IGNORE to a malicious pattern, for example:set history-ignore "(a+)+b"
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaax
Expected result:
Reproduction environment:
This is a denial-of-service vulnerability caused by catastrophic regex backtracking.
Applications embedding org.jline:jline-reader are impacted if they allow
HISTORY_IGNORE to be configured through user configuration or application settings.
The issue is lower severity than the interactive editor findings because the attacker
must control configuration, but it can still reliably hang a reader session.
The safest fix for the current git head is to stop treating arbitrary HISTORY_IGNORE
content as a regex. Instead, escape all characters by default and translate only the
intended JLine wildcard syntax (*) and separator syntax (:).
Suggested patch:
diff --git a/reader/src/main/java/org/jline/reader/impl/history/DefaultHistory.java b/reader/src/main/java/org/jline/reader/impl/history/DefaultHistory.java
--- a/reader/src/main/java/org/jline/reader/impl/history/DefaultHistory.java
+++ b/reader/src/main/java/org/jline/reader/impl/history/DefaultHistory.java
@@
StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();
for (int i = 0; i < patterns.length(); i++) {
char ch = patterns.charAt(i);
if (ch == '\\') {
ch = patterns.charAt(++i);
- sb.append(ch);
+ sb.append(Pattern.quote(Character.toString(ch)));
} else if (ch == ':') {
sb.append('|');
} else if (ch == '*') {
sb.append('.').append('*');
} else {
- sb.append(ch);
+ sb.append(Pattern.quote(Character.toString(ch)));
}
}
return line.matches(sb.toString());
This issue was identified by Michał Majchrowicz and Marcin Wyczechowski, members of the AFINE Team.
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.18%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 7.8% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 11/8/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
Talk to us about this
Find out whether this dependency (or others like it) is actually reachable in your codebase.
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A secure code review or supply chain review finds this before an advisory does.