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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: < 1.13.0
Patched in 1.13.0
Details
A query parameter injection vulnerability exists in the AMQP client's connection URI formatting logic. When generating or parsing connection URIs, TLS-related filesystem paths (such as certificates or keys) are appended directly to the URI's query string using string concatenation rather than secure URL encoding via functions like url.QueryEscape.
If an application handles a TLS file path containing special character delimiters (such as & or =), these characters are interpreted as parameter separators by the URI parser. If the resulting URI.String() output is subsequently re-parsed via ParseURI, the injected fields can silently overwrite or hijack critical configuration parameters, forcing the client to use arbitrary connection settings or alternate TLS files.
The vulnerability lies within the lack of proper escaping when compiling connection string components into a raw URL format:
// Example of insecure string concatenation during URI building
uri := fmt.Sprintf("amqps://user:pass@host/%s?certfile=%s&keyfile=%s", vhost, certPath, keyPath)
Because certPath and keyPath are not passed through url.QueryEscape, special URL characters preserve their control meanings. For instance, if a user supply a certificate path named:
/tmp/cert=foo&keyfile=/evil/path
The generated string translates into:
...?certfile=/tmp/cert=foo&keyfile=/evil/path&keyfile=/original/path
When this string passes back through ParseURI (common in connection re-dial routines or configuration replication steps), standard URL parsing mechanics treat the string as multiple distinct parameters. Depending on map assignment order inside the parser, the injected keys take precedence over the original parameters.
By manipulating the file paths used for TLS assets, an attacker or compromised local sub-system can:
An attacker who has partial control over directory naming conventions or environmental variables used to specify local infrastructure paths can execute a parameter injection attack:
/var/lib/certs/client.crt?cacertfile=/tmp/fake_ca.crt&).cacertfile parameter, loading a different, unverified Certificate Authority string.EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.10%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 1.0% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 11/1/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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