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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: <= 2.26.7
Patched in 2.26.8
Details
http.paginate validates only the initial base_url, then follows server-supplied pagination targets (RFC 5988 Link: rel="next" headers, cursor/offset URLs) in a loop without revalidating each follow-up URL. An attacker's first-page response can point next at an internal address, causing a second-order SSRF whose internal body is aggregated into the returned items.
src/core/modules/atomic/http/paginate.py:495 validates base_url (first URL only). The pagination loop _paginate_link_header reads next_url via _parse_link_header (:203), sets url=next_url (:208), and calls session.request(method, url) (:196) with NO validate call in the loop (:186-208 has zero guard calls).
Readable second-order SSRF that bypasses the SSRF control; internal/metadata body aggregated into all_items and returned to the caller (C:H, S:C).
Verified live: http.paginate with allowlisted base 127.0.0.1 followed a Link: <http://127.0.0.3/...>; rel="next" (non-allowlisted) and returned INTERNAL-NEXTPAGE-SECRET in the aggregated items.
execute_module http.paginate {"url":"http://attacker.tld/p1","strategy":"link_header"}
attacker p1 response header: Link: <http://<cloud-metadata-ip>/latest/meta-data/>; rel="next"
http.paginate {url:"http://attacker.tld/p1", strategy:"link_header"}. Guard: validate_url_with_env_config(base_url) (paginate.py:495) — validates the FIRST url only._paginate_link_header reads next_url (_parse_link_header :203), url=next_url (:208), session.request(method,url) (:196) — NO validate call in the loop. Bypass proof: only :495 validates; loop at :186-208 has zero guard calls.all_items and returned → readable second-order SSRF.Live PoC followed a Link header into non-allowlisted loopback and returned the internal marker in aggregated results. Only base_url is validated; the follow loop never revalidates.
<= 2.26.6 — paginate.py:495 + loop present on latest release tag.
Run every follow-up URL (Link header, cursor, offset target) through validate_url_with_env_config before fetching it inside the pagination loop.
Vulnerability discovered by zx (Jace).
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