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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: <= 0.5.6
Patched in 0.5.7
Details
When obsidian-sync-mcp runs without MCP_AUTH_TOKEN (the documented no-auth mode for local use), the HTTP MCP endpoint does not validate the Host or Origin header before dispatching MCP methods (CWE-350). The no-auth mode's "local network only" assumption therefore does not hold: a malicious web page the operator visits can use DNS rebinding to resolve an attacker-controlled hostname to 127.0.0.1 (or the operator's LAN/VPN/Docker-published address) and issue requests the server accepts as trusted local calls, reaching the full tool surface (read_note, write_note, edit_note, delete_note, move_note, list_notes, list_folders, list_tags, get_note_metadata).
Affected versions: <= 0.5.6 Patched version: 0.5.7
Any deployment running without MCP_AUTH_TOKEN — including the README "Filesystem mode (simplest)" quickstart and the self-hosted docker-compose setup (where MCP_AUTH_TOKEN defaults to empty)" — is exposed to any website the operator visits while the server is running. That page's JavaScript can silently read the entire vault and create/overwrite/delete/move notes, with no credentials and no prompt. In CouchDB/Self-hosted LiveSync mode, the same code path applies, so vault content in CouchDB is equally reachable. Deployments that set MCP_AUTH_TOKEN are not affected — a bearer token is not attached by browsers, so a forged request returns HTTP 401.
Upgrade to 0.5.7, which validates both the Host and Origin headers in no-auth mode: any request whose Host is not localhost/127.0.0.1/::1 (or a value in the new MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS), or that carries a cross-origin Origin not in that allowlist, is rejected before any MCP method runs. The Host check defeats DNS rebinding; the Origin check defeats the related bypass where a page directly fetches http://127.0.0.1:<port>/mcp (genuine loopback Host, attacker Origin) — the transport's wildcard CORS would otherwise expose the response. Non-browser MCP clients send no Origin, so they are unaffected. These checks block browser-delivered attacks only; a direct non-browser network client can still forge both headers, so on untrusted networks set MCP_AUTH_TOKEN.
Workaround (any version): set MCP_AUTH_TOKEN to require authentication — this closes the path immediately.
In no-auth mode serverOptions.authenticate was never installed, so FastMCP dispatched every request with no per-request check. Even with a token, only the Authorization header was inspected — nothing in the server, fastmcp, or mcp-proxy validated Host/Origin. Two browser-reachable variants follow: (1) classic DNS rebinding, where the browser sends the attacker's hostname in Host; and (2) a direct cross-origin fetch() to the loopback address, where Host is genuinely 127.0.0.1 but Origin is attacker-controlled and the transport's wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * exposes the response — no rebinding required. The 0.5.7 fix adds an application-layer Host+Origin check in authenticate that rejects such requests before dispatch; it is a compensating control and does not alter the wildcard CORS header itself (the rejection happens before any response body is produced).
# No-auth server (per the README quickstart)
VAULT_PATH=/tmp/demo-vault HOST=127.0.0.1 PORT=8787 npx tsx src/main.ts
# Forged Host/Origin (what a DNS-rebinding page's fetch() sends) reaches the tools with no credential:
curl -s -i http://127.0.0.1:8787/mcp \
-H "Host: attacker.example" -H "Origin: http://attacker.example" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Accept: application/json, text/event-stream" \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-06-18","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"poc","version":"1.0"}}}'
# -> HTTP 200; a follow-up tools/call to write_note creates a file in the vault, no Authorization header.
# The same sequence against a server with MCP_AUTH_TOKEN set returns HTTP 401.
# Variant 2 — no rebinding needed: real loopback Host, attacker Origin.
# In <= 0.5.6 this returns 200 and executes tools; in 0.5.7 it returns 403.
curl -s -i http://127.0.0.1:8787/mcp \
-H "Host: 127.0.0.1:8787" -H "Origin: http://attacker.example" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Accept: application/json, text/event-stream" \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-06-18","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"poc","version":"1.0"}}}'
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.38%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 32.2% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 11/19/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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