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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: >= 3.0.0, < 3.10.0
Patched in 3.10.0
Details
A vulnerability in Nuclei's DAST template loading path allows unsigned code: protocol templates to execute, bypassing the cryptographic signature requirement that is meant to prevent arbitrary command execution from untrusted templates.
Affected Component
The issue is in the template loader's DAST loading branch. When -dast is enabled and a template contains a fuzzing: block, the loader accepted the template through a code path that omitted the unsigned-code-template signature check present in the normal loading branch.
Description
Nuclei requires code: protocol templates to be cryptographically signed before execution. Unsigned code templates are normally skipped with a warning. However, when a template combined a fuzzing: block (making it DAST-eligible) with an unsigned code: block, enabling -dast routed the template through the DAST loader branch, which did not enforce signature verification.
For multiprotocol templates containing both HTTP and code: blocks, the unsigned code request was included in the execution queue regardless of whether -code was set. This allowed arbitrary shell command execution from an unsigned code: block with only -dast enabled.
[!NOTE] Both DAST mode (
-dast) and code-protocol templates are disabled by default. Code templates normally require both the-codeflag and a valid template signature. This issue bypassed the signature and-codecontrols only when-dastwas explicitly enabled.
Affected Users
-dast) with untrusted or attacker-supplied templates that contain both fuzzing: and code: blocks.Patches
Mitigation
Upgrade to Nuclei v3.10.0, where code template signature verification is enforced before DAST loading.
In the meantime, avoid running DAST scans with untrusted templates.
Workarounds
If upgrading is not an option, do not use -dast with templates from unverified sources.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to @daffainfo for reporting this issue.
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.18%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 7.8% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 11/7/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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