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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: < 0.11.1
Patched in 0.11.1
Details
The Miren Runtime RPC server (QUIC/HTTP3, default port :8443) requested TLS
client certificates but never verified that a presented certificate chained to
the cluster Certificate Authority. Because a client-certificate identity is
granted a blanket RBAC bypass, any party able to reach the RPC listener could
present a forged, self-signed certificate and be authenticated as a cluster
superuser — no valid CA signature, credential, or prior authorization
required.
This is a complete, unauthenticated authentication bypass against the cluster control plane. An attacker who can reach the RPC port can perform any RPC operation with full privileges: enumerate and manipulate entities, apps, sandboxes, disks, and other cluster resources. This yields full compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the cluster and everything it orchestrates.
Exposure is network-reachability–gated only. Deployments that expose :8443
beyond a trusted network (e.g. 0.0.0.0/0) are remotely exploitable from the
internet by anyone; deployments that restrict :8443 to a trusted network are
exploitable by any party with access to that network.
Due to a lack of ability to detect if the RPC has been accessed unauthorized, Miren recommends that all applications are redeployed and any credentials reference in environment variables are rotated. A read-only script to help review standing access, recent changes, and the exact secrets to rotate is available at https://github.com/mirendev/runtime/tree/089582a132f7fc1e1d5b5c0aee1e0911535fed53/scripts/security/audit-exposure.
Three independent factors combined to produce the bypass:
The listener never verified the client-certificate chain. When a cluster
CA was configured, the RPC listener used tls.RequestClientCert, which
requests a client certificate but does not verify it against the configured
ClientCAs. tls.ConnectionState.VerifiedChains was therefore always empty,
and no VerifyPeerCertificate/VerifyConnection hook re-checked the chain.
The authenticator derived identity from an unverified certificate. The
RPC authenticators read PeerCertificates[0].Subject.CommonName directly as
the caller identity, with method cert, without checking that the chain had
been verified.
Authorization granted a blanket bypass to certificate identities. The
authorizer returned "allowed" for any cert-method identity, skipping all
RBAC checks.
Go's TLS client only presents a certificate whose issuer Distinguished Name matches a CA advertised by the server, but that comparison is on the (public, non-secret) DN bytes only — it does not require a valid signature from the CA. An attacker can therefore mint a self-signed certificate whose issuer DN is byte-identical to the cluster CA subject, signed with an attacker-controlled key. The stock client presents it, and the vulnerable server accepts it and trusts its CommonName as a superuser identity.
Fixed by verifying the client-certificate chain before trusting it:
tls.VerifyClientCertIfGiven when a cluster CA is
configured. A presented certificate must chain to the configured CA to
complete the handshake, while certless callers (JWT/OIDC, which authenticate
via the Authorization header) are still admitted.VerifiedChains before deriving an identity from a client certificate.Users should upgrade to the patched release and restart the server so the new listener configuration takes effect.
Until the patch is deployed, restrict network access to the RPC port (:8443)
so that it is not reachable from untrusted networks — remove any
0.0.0.0/0 ingress and limit it to trusted management networks. This is a
containment measure only and does not remove the underlying vulnerability.
More go advisories
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A secure code review or supply chain review finds this before an advisory does.