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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: <= 0.23.34
Patched in 0.23.35
Vulnerable: <= 0.23.34
Patched in 0.23.35
Vulnerable: <= 0.23.34
Patched in 0.23.35
Vulnerable: >= 1.0.0-M1, <= 1.0.0-M46
Patched in 1.0.0-M47
Vulnerable: >= 1.0.0-M1, <= 1.0.0-M46
Patched in 1.0.0-M47
Details
The DigestAuth replay defence stores lastNc + 1 rather than the nonce-count (nc) value it just accepted. When a legitimate client sends non-contiguous nc values (parallel or retried requests, as browsers do), the server's counter lags behind the highest nc seen, and a captured Authorization header can be replayed multiple times.
A passive observer can turn one captured Digest-authenticated request into several replayed authenticated (state-changing) requests, defeating the core replay protection Digest provides over Basic.
DigestAuth.nc more than one greater than the last, for instance from a parallel or retried request.EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.40%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 33.7% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 10/30/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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A secure code review or supply chain review finds this before an advisory does.