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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: <= 3.7.13
Vulnerable: >= 4.0.0, <= 4.3.1
Patched in 4.3.2
Details
The Media Library upload handler validates the destination filename against an extension allowlist (default_extensions), rejecting types such as php, phtml, html, and htm. The image crop handler (MediaManager::onCropImage / cropImage) did not perform this check. The destination filename was taken from user input, the extension was extracted from it, and the staged bytes were written to the public media folder under that attacker-chosen extension. Combined with the fact that upload accepts any file contents under an allowlisted extension (a PHP payload disguised as .jpg), and that the zero-dimension crop branch performs a byte-for-byte File::copy rather than re-encoding the pixels, an authenticated backend user with the media.library.create permission could write a file with arbitrary extension and arbitrary contents into the public media folder.
Scope of impact depends on web server configuration. On a default October CMS install (using the shipped Apache .htaccess or nginx.conf), PHP execution from the media folder is blocked, so the realistic outcome is stored XSS via .html or .svg files served from the application origin. On a server that is configured to execute PHP inside the media directory (a non-default but real-world misconfiguration), the same bug becomes remote code execution.
.html or .svg files served from the application origin, executing script in the browser of any backend user or visitor who opens the fileHtml::cleanVector step only runs on the upload path, so uploading malicious SVG content as a .jpg and then cropping it to .svg skips the sanitizer entirelymedia.library.create permissionThe vulnerability has been patched in v3.7.18 and v4.3.3. The crop handler now applies the same extension allowlist check as the upload handler before staging the output file. As defense in depth, the central MediaLibrary::put and MediaLibrary::putFile write methods now validate the destination extension as well, so any future write path that goes through the library inherits the check. All users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest patched version.
If upgrading immediately is not possible:
media.library.create permission to fully trusted backend users only.htaccess and nginx.conf already enforce this)EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.56%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 47.4% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 11/19/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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