
Loading

Loading
We use strictly necessary cookies to run this site, and analytics cookies to understand how it's used. See our Privacy Policy for details.
A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: <= 5.21.1
Patched in 5.21.2
Details
The rex_list component reads the SQL sort column directly from the sort GET parameter without validating it against the set of columns declared sortable via setColumnSortable(). Although the value is wrapped in backticks via escapeIdentifier() (preventing classical SQL injection), this still allows any authenticated backend user to ORDER BY any column in the query's FROM tables, including unselected sensitive columns such as password from the rex_user table, and perform error-based column enumeration.
File: redaxo/src/core/lib/list.php:976-982 — getSortColumn() returns the raw request parameter without whitelist check:
public function getSortColumn($default = null)
{
if (rex_request('list', 'string') == $this->getName()) {
return rex_request('sort', 'string', $default); // NO validation against sortable columns
}
return $default;
}
File: redaxo/src/core/lib/list.php:899-911 — prepareQuery() uses it directly in the ORDER BY clause:
protected function prepareQuery($query, array $defaultSort = [])
{
$sortColumn = $this->getSortColumn();
if ('' != $sortColumn) {
$sql = rex_sql::factory($this->db);
$sortColumn = $sql->escapeIdentifier($sortColumn); // backtick-wraps, but no whitelist
if ($defaultSort || false === stripos($query, ' ORDER BY ')) {
$query .= ' ORDER BY ' . $sortColumn . ' ' . $sortType;
}
}
The users list queries rex_user which contains password, previous_passwords, password_change_required — not in the SELECT. Specifying a non-existent column name produces a MySQL Unknown column exception whose message is propagated to the user, confirming or denying column existence.
Column enumeration (error-based):
GET /redaxo/index.php?page=users&list=<list_name>&sort=nonexistent_col&sorttype=asc
Response will contain: Unknown column 'nonexistent_col' in 'order clause'
Sort by password hash (data ordering leak):
GET /redaxo/index.php?page=users&list=<list_name>&sort=password&sorttype=asc
Users are silently reordered by their Argon2 password hash.
Authenticated backend users (non-admin) can enumerate database column names of internal tables via error messages and manipulate query ordering to include sensitive unselected columns. While this does not allow arbitrary SQL execution due to backtick escaping, it constitutes an information disclosure vulnerability enabling targeted further attacks.
Validate the sort request parameter against the whitelist of columns registered with setColumnSortable() before use in the query:
public function getSortColumn($default = null)
{
if (rex_request('list', 'string') == $this->getName()) {
$requested = rex_request('sort', 'string', $default);
if ($requested !== null && $this->hasColumnOption($requested, REX_LIST_OPT_SORT)) {
return $requested;
}
}
return $default;
}
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.39%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 33.1% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 11/9/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
Talk to us about this
Find out whether this dependency (or others like it) is actually reachable in your codebase.
Get help patching, or building dependency-scanning into your pipeline going forward.
A secure code review or supply chain review finds this before an advisory does.