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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: < 0.2.5
Patched in 0.2.6
Details
The Halo 2 aggregation circuit could mishandle proof elements encoded as the point at infinity.
When an assigned proof point appeared in an MSM term with constant scalar one, the Halo 2 loader used a scalar-one shortcut that passed the assigned point directly into the EC sum helper. The EC sum implementation used by that path assumed its inputs were non-identity points, while assigned proof points could represent the encoded identity (0, 0).
EcPointLoader::multi_scalar_multiplication partitions MSM terms by scalar and base type. For (Value::Constant(ONE), Value::Assigned(_)), the loader placed the assigned base into the non-scaled variable-base list and later passed those points to sum_with_const.
The default Halo 2 shim delegates sum_with_const to halo2-lib EccChip::sum. In affected versions, that sum helper used incomplete affine addition and assumed that every input point was non-identity. A prover-controlled proof point encoded as (0, 0) could therefore enter the final aggregation sum through the scalar-one shortcut and affect the MSM or accumulator computation.
The issue was fixed in halo2-lib by updating EccChip::sum to treat encoded identity inputs as no-ops and to return (0, 0) when the total sum is the identity. This removes the non-identity input precondition from callers such as the Halo 2 aggregation loader.
Recursive aggregation circuits using the Halo 2 loader could compute an MSM or accumulator with an identity proof element in a path whose implementation assumed non-identity inputs. This breaks the expected handling of point-at-infinity proof elements in aggregation.
Practical exploitability depends on the surrounding aggregation and final-decider checks, so this is rated medium severity.
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.30%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 23.3% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 11/20/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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