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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: < 0.21.1
Patched in 0.21.1
Details
Extracting an attacker-supplied 7z archive can write files outside the destination directory. The 7z header stores each entry's path as a UTF-16 name with nothing constraining it to a relative, in-tree path. The extractor joins that name onto the destination and writes to the result without normalizing it or checking that it stays under the destination root, so an entry named ../../etc/cron.d/x or an absolute path escapes the target.
In src/util/decompress.rs, decompress_impl computes the per-entry destination directly (line 140):
let dest_path = dest.join(entry.name());
extract_fn(entry, reader, &dest_path)
default_entry_extract_fn (line 154) then acts on that path:
let file = File::create(path)
.map_err(|e| Error::file_open(e, path.to_string_lossy().to_string()))?;
There is no normalization, no dest_path.starts_with(dest) check, and no symlink-entry handling. Path::join discards the base when the joined component is absolute, and .. components are not collapsed against the base. The convenience entry points (decompress, decompress_file, decompress_with_password, decompress_file_with_password) all route through decompress_impl with default_entry_extract_fn, so the default API is affected.
The trust boundary is the archive bytes. Any caller that extracts an untrusted .7z reaches the sink.
.7z whose FilesInfo contains an entry named ../../../../tmp/pwned (or, on Windows, an absolute path such as C:\Windows\Temp\pwned).sevenz_rust2::decompress_file("evil.7z", "./out")../out. Targeting a startup/cron path or a config file turns the write into code execution or persistence.Arbitrary file write outside the intended directory (CWE-22 / CWE-23, the Zip-Slip class). On extraction of an attacker-controlled archive, an entry overwrites files outside the destination — config, cron, autostart, or build artifacts — which can escalate to code execution. Reachable by upload-handling backends, malware-analysis sandboxes, mod/game installers, and CI steps that unpack user-supplied 7z files.
Reject any entry whose name contains a ParentDir, RootDir, or Prefix component, or canonicalize the joined path and verify starts_with(dest) before creating it. Apply the guard inside default_entry_extract_fn (and decompress_impl) so the hardening is the default rather than left to each caller. Reject or explicitly opt-in symlink entries.
This issue was patched with ef760b61f3535ac8b93006212aef41bfebc237eb and released as v0.21.1 to crates.io
Consumers that extract attacker-supplied archives received over a network without user interaction should re-score as AV:N/UI:N (≈8.6).
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.14%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 3.2% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 11/21/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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