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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: < 0.4.2
Patched in 0.4.2
Details
In SSE/HTTP transport mode, mysql_mcp_server constructs SseServerTransport without passing security_settings. As a result, the MCP Python SDK's DNS-rebinding protection (Origin/Host header validation) is disabled; the Starlette application has no CORS or TrustedHost middleware; and the service binds to 0.0.0.0 by default with no authentication on any route.
Trigger condition: MCP_TRANSPORT=sse. The default stdio mode is not affected.
Scenario A — Direct exposure: Any network attacker can invoke execute_sql to run arbitrary SQL without credentials → full data dump, and via MySQL FILE privileges, arbitrary file read/write and RCE.
Scenario B — DNS rebinding (local bind): An attacker lures a victim's browser to a malicious page, rebinds their domain to 127.0.0.1, and uses the browser as a proxy to invoke execute_sql as same-origin.
In src/mysql_mcp_server/server.py:
SseServerTransport is constructed without security_settings — the SDK defaults enable_dns_rebinding_protection to False./, /sse, /messages/) are unauthenticated.0.0.0.0 by default.cursor.execute(query) with a fully attacker-controlled query.FILE privilege: arbitrary file read (LOAD_FILE) and write (INTO OUTFILE) — potential RCE via webshell dropReleased in v0.4.2: DNS-rebinding protection is now enabled by passing TransportSecuritySettings(enable_dns_rebinding_protection=True) to SseServerTransport, and the documented recommended bind address is 127.0.0.1.
Discovered by Huanchen, SongWu (JHU), and BrookeYangRui (JHU).
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.42%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 36.1% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 10/30/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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