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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: < 5.0.0
Patched in 5.0.0
Details
The partial-pipeline resume mechanism accepted partial_token as a bearer credential without binding it to the browser session that created it.
Applications using resumable partial pipeline steps could allow an attacker to start an authentication flow, obtain a valid partial token and verification data, and cause a victim's browser to resume that attacker-controlled flow. This could authenticate the victim's browser as the attacker's account.
The issue affects applications using partial pipeline steps such as mail_validation or custom steps decorated with @partial.
The issue has been fixed by binding partial pipeline resumes to the originating browser session.
Users should upgrade to a patched version.
Fix:
Applications that cannot upgrade immediately should disable resumable partial pipeline steps, including mail_validation and custom steps decorated with @partial.
If those flows are required, applications should avoid accepting partial resume links from untrusted contexts until a patched version can be deployed.
There is no complete workaround while continuing to use the vulnerable partial-pipeline resume mechanism.
Reported through GitHub private vulnerability reporting by Liyi Zhou, Ziyue Wang, Strick, Maurice, and Chenchen Yu from the University of Sydney security research team.
Reporter references:
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.16%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 5.0% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 11/9/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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A secure code review or supply chain review finds this before an advisory does.