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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: <= 3.10.3
Patched in 3.10.4
Details
nltk.parse.recursivedescent.SteppingRecursiveDescentParser.parse() performs an unbounded top-down search over ambiguous or self-embedding context-free grammars with no wall-clock or step limit. An actor who can influence the grammar and supply a short input to a caller that uses this parser can force a single parse() call to pin a CPU core indefinitely, producing a denial of service. The related base class RecursiveDescentParser gained a max_time wall-clock deadline, but the stepping subclass drives its own step loop and never arms or consults that deadline, and its constructor does not accept a max_time parameter, so the guard cannot be enabled on this path.
RecursiveDescentParser bounds its recursive search inside _parse: it arms a wall-clock deadline on the first step and raises TimeoutError once max_time (default 5.0 seconds) is exceeded. SteppingRecursiveDescentParser was designed for interactive single-stepping and overrides both parse() and _parse. Its parse() runs initialize() followed by a while self.step() is not None loop that never enters the guarded base _parse. Its _parse override is a state-capturing stub that records history and returns a sentinel, and it never references the inherited self._parse_deadline or self._max_time. Its __init__ signature omits max_time entirely, so a caller cannot enable or tighten a bound. The security invariant that a single parse must terminate within a bounded time is therefore never enforced on this parser.
Affected component: nltk.parse.recursivedescent.SteppingRecursiveDescentParser
- parse() nltk/parse/recursivedescent.py:428-433 (drives its own step loop, no bound armed or checked)
- _parse() nltk/parse/recursivedescent.py:643-668 (stub override; never consults self._parse_deadline / self._max_time)
- __init__() nltk/parse/recursivedescent.py:410-418 (signature (self, grammar, trace=0); no max_time parameter)
Base guard for comparison: RecursiveDescentParser._parse nltk/parse/recursivedescent.py:141-150
An actor who controls or influences the grammar passed to SteppingRecursiveDescentParser and can supply a short token sequence to a caller that invokes parse() can cause that call to never return. The top-down search enumerates a derivation space that grows on the order of the Catalan numbers with no memoization of the search and no deadline, so one crafted grammar plus a short input deterministically consumes a CPU core. In a deployment that parses attacker-influenced input on a bounded worker pool, repeated requests exhaust the pool and deny service to legitimate users. No authentication, privilege, or user interaction is required in that worst-credible deployment. Exploitation requires that the target actually use this parser on untrusted input; because the stepping parser is primarily a debugging or interactive-stepping component that backs a GUI, real-world exposure is narrower than for the base parser, though parse() is a supported public method that behaves as a full parser.
Requires only the nltk package (3.10.3) and standard library; no data downloads or network access.
Reproduction steps:
S -> 'a' S S | 'a'.RecursiveDescentParser(g, max_time=2.0).parse(['a']*17) raises TimeoutError at about 2 seconds.import time, inspect
from nltk import CFG
from nltk.parse.recursivedescent import RecursiveDescentParser, SteppingRecursiveDescentParser
g = CFG.fromstring("S -> 'a' S S | 'a'")
# Base parser is bounded and self-terminates.
try:
list(RecursiveDescentParser(g, max_time=2.0).parse(['a'] * 17))
except TimeoutError:
print("base: TimeoutError (guarded)")
# Stepping subclass cannot be bounded: no max_time parameter.
print("stepping __init__ sig:", inspect.signature(SteppingRecursiveDescentParser.__init__))
# Stepping parser runs unbounded on the same input.
t0 = time.perf_counter()
list(SteppingRecursiveDescentParser(g).parse(['a'] * 17)) # does not return
print("stepping: returned after", time.perf_counter() - t0)
base: TimeoutError (guarded)
stepping __init__ sig: (self, grammar, trace=0)
# stepping len3: 1 parse in 0.001s ; len7: 5 in 0.017s ; len9: 14 in 0.075s ; len11: 42 in 0.36s
# stepping len17: still running past a 10s watchdog, process alive, no RecursionError
nltk.parse.SteppingRecursiveDescentParser, a public exported symbol (nltk/parse/__init__.py:97), invoking parse(tokens) on grammar and input influenced by an actor.S -> 'a' S S | 'a') and supplies a short token list (for example 17 copies of 'a'). Both survive to the parser unchanged.parse() (recursivedescent.py:428) calls initialize() then loops while self.step() is not None; step() (:479) calls match()/expand() (:552/:512) which call the inherited _match/_expand (:172/:214), which resolve self._parse by MRO to the subclass stub (:643).max_time wall-clock deadline exists only in the base _parse (:141-150) and is never entered on this path; the stub _parse records state and returns without consulting the deadline, and __init__ exposes no max_time to enable a bound.parse() call never returns and pins a CPU core; repeated calls exhaust a bounded worker pool, denying service.The prior fix for this class of issue added a max_time wall-clock deadline to the base RecursiveDescentParser._parse (recursivedescent.py:141-150, default 5.0 seconds). This report demonstrates that the fix does not cover the sibling SteppingRecursiveDescentParser entry point, and the maintainers separately hardened other parsers (chart, earley chart, viterbi, shift-reduce, non-projective dependency) with max_time while leaving this subclass unbounded.
Challenges attempted and their outcomes:
self._max_time value (observed at 5.0) makes the path guarded: refuted; the value is inherited but never read on the stepping path, and the parser runs unbounded despite it being set.inspect.signature(SteppingRecursiveDescentParser.__init__) is (self, grammar, trace=0), with no max_time parameter.RecursionError rather than CPU exhaustion: refuted; the step loop is iterative over an explicit history stack, so no exception is raised within a 10 second watchdog, CPU time grows exponentially with input length, and a small negative control input returns in about 0.001 seconds._tried_e/_tried_m records collapse the search: refuted; those records are keyed by the frozen full partial tree, so they deduplicate only identical productions at identical states and do not prevent the exponential enumeration.Ecosystem: PyPIPackage: nltkConfirmed affected range: <= 3.10.3Latest release checked: 3.10.3 (PyPI sdist nltk-3.10.3.tar.gz)Fix status: 3.10.4The stepping subclass has never carried a time or step bound in any released version; the prior fix added the guard only to the base class. The vulnerable methods were verified present in the exact published PyPI 3.10.3 source distribution (parse() at lines 428-433, stub _parse at 643-668 with no deadline reference, and __init__ without max_time). Because the class predates the prior fix and no specific historical introduction tag was pinned, the lower bound is left open rather than invented; the upper bound is verified against the current published artifact (3.10.3). No released fix exists.
Enforce a bounded parse on the stepping parser: give SteppingRecursiveDescentParser its own wall-clock or step-count budget that is checked inside its step loop (for example in parse() and/or the _parse/step path), and add a max_time (or equivalent step-limit) parameter to __init__ that is propagated and honored, mirroring the base RecursiveDescentParser and the other hardened sibling parsers. As an interim mitigation without a code change, callers should avoid invoking SteppingRecursiveDescentParser.parse() on grammars or input derived from untrusted sources, run any such parsing under an external timeout or a separate resource-limited process, and prefer a chart parser for untrusted input.
Reported by zx (GitHub: @manus-pi).
PR: #3895 "[WIP] Bound algorithmic-DoS and uncontrolled-recursion vectors (CWE-400/407/674/1333)", open, head b22ebe144.
Fix commit: e20c40e26 "Bound tokenizer/parser algorithmic DoS (ffr9/gpwc/8fx7)" (SteppingRecursiveDescentParser gains the max_time parameter, default 5.0 s, and honours the parse deadline).
No probe. The advisory PoC re-run (grammar S -> 'a' S S | 'a', 17 tokens): on the PR head the parse raises TimeoutError after 5.0 s and the constructor signature is (self, grammar, trace=0, max_time=5.0); on develop 2fa3f48fe the same parse ran past a 45 s watchdog, so develop is still VULNERABLE.
Release: none.
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.49%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 42.6% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 11/14/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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