
Loading

Loading
We use strictly necessary cookies to run this site, and analytics cookies to understand how it's used. See our Privacy Policy for details.
A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: <= 1.4.0
Patched in 1.4.1
Details
BigInteger.prototype.modInverse() in node-forge's bundled jsbn library enters an infinite loop when the value or the modulus is negative, for example when a negative public exponent is passed to forge.pki.rsa.generateKeyPair(). This is an incomplete fix of CVE-2026-33891 (GHSA-5m6q-g25r-mvwx), which handled only a zero value. Fixed in node-forge 1.4.1.
bnModInverse() (lib/jsbn.js, exposed as forge.jsbn.BigInteger.prototype.modInverse) implements the binary extended Euclidean algorithm (Handbook of Applied Cryptography, Algorithm 14.61), which is defined for positive integers. With a negative operand the loop cannot terminate: rShiftTo is an arithmetic shift, so a negative value never moves towards zero, and the loop's exit condition (u reaching zero) is never met. The calling thread spins at 100% CPU indefinitely; in Node.js this blocks the event loop. Memory does not grow.
node-forge 1.4.0 fixed CVE-2026-33891 (GHSA-5m6q-g25r-mvwx) by returning zero early when this.signum() == 0, although its changelog describes the check as "<= 0". Negative values were not covered, and a negative modulus was never handled. Every negative input that did terminate already returned zero.
Within node-forge, RSA key generation is the only path to a negative operand: the caller's public exponent e becomes BigInteger.fromInt(e), and state.e.modInverse(state.phi) is called with it. gcd() works on absolute values, so the coprimality checks pass and the loop is reached. Any exponent other than 3 or 65537 uses the pure JavaScript implementation, even when forge.options.usePureJavaScript is not set. RFC 8017, Section 3.1 requires the RSA public exponent to be at least 3.
Values that node-forge parses (DER, PEM, JWK, PKCS#12, X.509, TLS) are always read as unsigned integers and cannot produce a negative operand.
The fix makes modInverse() return zero when the value or the modulus is zero or negative, as it already does when no inverse exists. Results for positive inputs are unchanged.
This issue was reported by wzc.
Fixed in node-forge 1.4.1. modInverse() now returns zero when the value or the modulus is zero or negative.
>= 3.BigInteger#modInverse() with negative operands. Reduce the value modulo a positive modulus first (x.mod(m).modInverse(m)).A negative public exponent passed to RSA key generation never returns (also with the callback form and with createKeyPairGenerationState() / stepKeyPairGenerationState()):
var forge = require('node-forge');
forge.pki.rsa.generateKeyPair({bits: 256, e: -1}); // hangs at 100% CPU
Calling modInverse() directly with a negative value or modulus hangs the same way:
var BigInteger = forge.jsbn.BigInteger;
new BigInteger('-1').modInverse(new BigInteger('7')); // hangs
new BigInteger('3').modInverse(new BigInteger('-7')); // hangs
With the fix, these calls return zero. The regression tests are in tests/unit/jsbn.js.
Applications are affected only if they:
e to forge.pki.rsa.generateKeyPair(), forge.pki.rsa.createKeyPairGenerationState() or forge.pki.rsa.stepKeyPairGenerationState(), orforge.jsbn.BigInteger#modInverse() directly with negative values derived from untrusted input.An attacker who can supply such a value makes the call hang indefinitely at 100% CPU, which blocks the Node.js event loop (denial of service). Keys and other data parsed by node-forge (DER, PEM, JWK, PKCS#12, X.509, TLS) cannot trigger this issue, and the documented usage of key generation passes a constant exponent (65537). There is no effect on confidentiality or integrity.
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.12%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 1.7% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 10/31/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
Talk to us about this
Find out whether this dependency (or others like it) is actually reachable in your codebase.
Get help patching, or building dependency-scanning into your pipeline going forward.
A secure code review or supply chain review finds this before an advisory does.