
Loading

Loading
We use strictly necessary cookies to run this site, and analytics cookies to understand how it's used. See our Privacy Policy for details.
A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: >= 2.0.0, < 2.2.0
Patched in 2.2.0
Vulnerable: >= 1.10.0, < 1.30.0
Patched in 1.30.0
Details
In affected versions, when a connected MCP server declared an outputSchema for a tool, the SDK's client validated each call_tool result with jsonschema's default resolver, which fetches any $ref it cannot resolve locally by opening the URL. A server could therefore put an http://, https:// or file:// reference in a tool's output schema and make the client:
Yes, if your application uses the SDK as an MCP client (ClientSession over any transport, ClientSessionGroup, or the 2.x Client) and calls tools on servers you do not fully control. There was no setting that turned the validation off.
Affected versions: 1.10.0 through 1.29.1, and 2.0.0 through 2.1.1.
Not affected: applications that only build servers. If nothing in your code uses ClientSession, ClientSessionGroup or the 2.x Client class, you are not affected.
Upgrade to mcp 1.30.0 (1.x) or 2.2.0 (2.x) or later. The client now resolves references only within the schema document the server sent (plus the standard JSON Schema metaschemas), so result validation performs no network or file access. A tool whose output schema points outside its own document fails at call time with RuntimeError (Invalid schema for tool ...); in-document references such as #/$defs/... work as before.
Until you can upgrade, call tools only on servers you trust. As a partial stopgap, skip tools whose outputSchema contains an $id, or a $ref / $dynamicRef that does not start with #.
Talk to us about this
Find out whether this dependency (or others like it) is actually reachable in your codebase.
Get help patching, or building dependency-scanning into your pipeline going forward.
A secure code review or supply chain review finds this before an advisory does.