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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: < 3.7.1
Patched in 3.7.1
Details
The API endpoint POST /api/v1/@apostrophecms/import-export/clean-export in @apostrophecms/import-export lacks authentication and authorization checks. Any client—including unauthenticated anonymous users who have obtained the standard CSRF cookie from visiting the site—can directly invoke this route and trigger the underlying self.cleanExport(req) method.
POST /api/v1/@apostrophecms/import-export/clean-exportpackages/import-export/lib/apiRoutes.js (lines 32–34)packages/import-export/lib/methods/import.js (lines 1271–1324)In packages/import-export/lib/apiRoutes.js, the get.related handler explicitly validates that the caller is logged in:
get: {
async related(req) {
if (!req.user) {
throw self.apos.error('forbidden');
}
// ...
}
}
In contrast, post.cleanExport (as well as post.overrideDuplicates) lacks any verification of req.user:
post: {
async overrideDuplicates(req) {
return self.overrideDuplicates(req);
},
async cleanExport(req) {
return self.cleanExport(req); // <-- No authentication check
}
}
Because ApostropheCMS does not enforce authentication globally on all apiRoutes, omitting an explicit if (!req.user) guard allows anonymous requests to pass directly through to the business logic layer.
When sending an unauthenticated POST request with the site’s CSRF cookie (issued to any visitor on GET /), the request bypasses access control entirely and executes self.cleanExport(req), as demonstrated by the server stack trace:
at Object.cleanExport (.../packages/import-export/lib/methods/import.js)
at .../packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/module/index.js:193:30
This confirms that execution directly reaches the core import-export handler without an authenticated session.
req.body.jobId (forcing them to ended: true, status: 'completed') and dismissing notifications via req.body.notificationId without verifying whether the resources belong to the requesting caller.Enforce an authentication check in packages/import-export/lib/apiRoutes.js before executing the underlying methods:
--- a/packages/import-export/lib/apiRoutes.js
+++ b/packages/import-export/lib/apiRoutes.js
@@ -26,10 +26,16 @@ module.exports = self => {
get: { ... },
post: {
async overrideDuplicates(req) {
+ if (!req.user) {
+ throw self.apos.error('forbidden');
+ }
return self.overrideDuplicates(req);
},
async cleanExport(req) {
+ if (!req.user) {
+ throw self.apos.error('forbidden');
+ }
return self.cleanExport(req);
}
}
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.33%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 24.6% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 10/21/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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