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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: < 2.4.8
Patched in 2.4.8
Vulnerable: >= 3.0.0, < 3.1.9
Patched in 3.1.9
Vulnerable: >= 4.0.0, < 4.2.3
Patched in 4.2.3
Details
fast-uri's serialize(), normalize(), and resolve(), when called with the non-default option reference: 'suffix' on a reference that has no authority, emit a relative reference whose first path segment contains a bare colon without escaping it. RFC 3986 section 3.3 requires the first segment of a path-noscheme reference not to contain a colon, precisely because a bare colon makes the string reparse as an absolute URI with a scheme. fast-uri's default serialization escapes that colon, but the suffix path does not.
For example, normalize('javascript:alert(1)', { reference: 'suffix' }) returns javascript:alert(1), which reparses as a live javascript: scheme; data: and vbscript: behave the same.
Applications that serialize or normalize a relative reference with reference: 'suffix' and then treat the result as a URI can turn inert input into a live javascript:, data:, or vbscript: URL (a cross-site scripting vector), and equal() can conflate a scheme-bearing reference with a relative one. Exposure is limited to applications that use the non-default reference: 'suffix' option.
Upgrade to fast-uri 2.4.8, 3.1.9, or 4.2.3.
Do not use the reference: 'suffix' option on untrusted input. If suffix output is required, percent-encode a colon in the first path segment of the result before treating it as a URI.
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.25%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 16.0% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 10/23/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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