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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: < 1.31.0
Patched in 1.31.0
Details
Cross-realm MQTT session disconnect without authorization
The disconnectUserSession endpoint in UserResourceImpl.java (line 443) accepts a realm path parameter but ignores it entirely, performing no authorization or realm-boundary check before force-disconnecting an MQTT session. Any authenticated user from any realm can disconnect MQTT broker sessions belonging to users in other realms by supplying the target session ID.
File: manager/src/main/java/org/openremote/manager/security/UserResourceImpl.java, lines 443-447
@Override
public void disconnectUserSession(RequestParams requestParams, String realm, String sessionID) {
if (!mqttBrokerService.disconnectSession(sessionID)) {
throw new NotFoundException("User session not found");
}
}
The REST interface at model/src/main/java/org/openremote/model/security/UserResource.java (line 201-204) maps this to GET {realm}/disconnect/{sessionID} with no @RolesAllowed annotation, so any authenticated user (not just admins) can call it.
CVE-2026-54641 (commit de89b8d) fixed cross-realm information disclosure in three read methods of the same file (get(), getUserClientRoles(), getUserRealmRoles()) and also added a realm check to getClientRoles(). The fix added throwIfCannotReadUserInRealm() and throwIfCannotAdminRealm() guards. However, disconnectUserSession was not patched and remains unprotected. Every other mutating method in this class has either a @RolesAllowed annotation on the interface or an explicit realm check in the implementation. This one has neither.
Given two realms, "master" and "building":
S.GET /api/master/user/master/disconnect/S with their building-realm bearer token.S in the global connectionIDConnectionMap, and calls doForceDisconnect(). User B's MQTT connection is terminated.Session IDs use the Netty ChannelId.asLongText() format (deterministic, partially sequential). While not trivially brute-forceable, IDs can leak through monitoring, logs, or correlated API calls. Within the same realm, any user (not just admins) can also disconnect sessions they should not have access to.
In a multi-tenant IoT deployment, an attacker authenticated in any realm can disrupt MQTT device connectivity in other realms. Since OpenRemote is used for building management, energy monitoring, and industrial IoT, forcibly disconnecting MQTT sessions can:
The method also uses HTTP GET for a destructive operation, making it susceptible to CSRF via image tags or link prefetch.
Add a realm administration check consistent with the pattern used elsewhere in this file:
@Override
public void disconnectUserSession(RequestParams requestParams, String realm, String sessionID) {
throwIfCannotAdminRealm(realm);
RemotingConnection connection = mqttBrokerService.getConnectionByID(sessionID);
if (connection == null) {
throw new NotFoundException("User session not found");
}
// Verify the session belongs to a user in the requested realm
// before disconnecting
if (!mqttBrokerService.disconnectSession(sessionID)) {
throw new NotFoundException("User session not found");
}
}
At minimum, add throwIfCannotAdminRealm(realm) as the first line, and consider adding a @RolesAllowed(Constants.WRITE_ADMIN_ROLE) annotation to the interface method. The HTTP method should also be changed from GET to DELETE.
AI assistance was used for the code audit and for drafting this report. The finding against the project's source at the location cited above was manually verified before reporting it, and the severity and impact assessment are the reporter's own.
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.32%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 25.7% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 11/20/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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