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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: < 3.2.2.0
Patched in 3.2.2.0
Details
Missing authorization in the update_folder action: any authenticated non-read-only user can rename, re-parent and convert to personal any folder in the instance, moving another team's credential subtree into their own personal space and removing it from the organization. Confirmed at HEAD 2f271cdd (3.2.1.1), and present at 3.1.3.1 and 3.1.7.6.
The folder-management endpoint dispatches an update_folder action that renames and re-parents a folder. Unlike its sibling actions in the same file, it never checks the edited folder id or the submitted parent id against the caller's accessible-folder set, and the file itself performs no session/authorization gate at all. By pointing the new parent at their own personal folder, an authenticated low-privilege user takes ownership of any folder in the instance.
app/sources/folders.queries.php:
(int) $isPersonal === 1.So update_folder is the one folder-mutating action in the file without an authorization predicate on either the target folder id or the new parent id.
An authenticated TeamPass user who is not read-only (no administrative role required). The attacker submits update_folder with the victim folder's id and a parentId pointing at their own personal folder. Because the new parent is personal, the personal-folder computation sets $isPersonal = 1, which satisfies the line 503 guard, and the update writes the new parent and personal_folder = 1 for the target folder.
Consequences: the stolen subtree is added to the attacker's accessible set on their next login, so the item list renders for them, and do_items_list_in_folder exposes the plaintext label, login, url, email and description of every credential in that subtree (item passwords stay sharekey-protected, hence C:L). Because the folder is now flagged personal, it disappears from the organization view for everyone else including administrators (the admin listing selects only personal_folder = 0), so this is also a denial of access to the real owners.
Source-verified at HEAD: no session/authorization helper anywhere in the file; the update_folder case contains no accessible-folders predicate while add_folder, delete_folders and copy_folder do; the personal-folder short-circuit at line 503. A live TeamPass instance was not stood up.
Secondary (needs a live confirmation before filing): there appears to be an unauthenticated variant. filter_input(INPUT_POST, 'key') returns null when omitted and $session->get('key') is null on a cookie-less session, so the null !== null comparison fails open; encryptClientServer is only set in public/index.php, so prepareExchangedData takes the plaintext-JSON branch. If that holds on a live instance this rises toward 9.4. The sibling actions fail closed on the anonymous path; only update_folder fails open. Please verify live, or report the authenticated variant alone (which stands on the source reading).
In the update_folder case, verify that both the target folder id and the submitted parentId are members of the caller's user-accessible_folders set (mirroring add_folder and delete_folders) before applying the update, and reject a re-parent that would flip personal_folder for a folder the caller does not own. Adding the standard session/authorization gate to folders.queries.php as a whole is the more durable fix. Note items.queries.php has a second, identically named update_folder case that does perform the accessible-folders check, but that one can only edit title/complexity; the unguarded copy in folders.queries.php is the one the UI calls for re-parenting.
AI assistance was used while investigating, but it was confirmed at HEAD that folders.queries.php contains no checkSession/userAccessPage call, that the update_folder case (lines 294-662) contains no accessible-folders predicate while add_folder (line 743) and delete_folders (line 904) do, and that the personal-folder short-circuit sits at line 503.
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.24%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 15.3% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 11/20/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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