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A GitHub-reviewed security advisory, not necessarily under active exploitation the way our CISA KEV advisories are, but a real, disclosed vulnerability in an open-source dependency.
Affected packages
Vulnerable: >= 2.2.0, < 2.2.2
Patched in 2.2.2
Details
An authenticated non-administrative user could access a Kubernetes cluster they are not authorized to access through GPUStack's Kubernetes API proxy.
The cluster_apiserver_proxy handler did not perform a resource-level authorization check before forwarding requests to the selected cluster. Requests were forwarded through a worker using its Kubernetes ServiceAccount credentials.
Depending on the permissions granted to that ServiceAccount, an attacker could read sensitive Kubernetes resources, create or modify workloads, or delete resources and disrupt services. Creating attacker-controlled workloads could result in code execution in the target cluster.
Exploitation requires a Kubernetes-provider cluster with a reachable worker. The operations available to the attacker are limited by the worker's ServiceAccount permissions.
Fixed in gpustack v2.2.2.
Restrict access to the GPUStack instance to trusted administrator accounts until upgrading.
EPSS, exploit probability
Low0.36%
estimated chance of real-world exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 30.1% of every CVE FIRST.org scores
Refreshed 11/10/2026, via FIRST.org's EPSS model, not CVSS, this measures likelihood of exploitation, not how severe it would be.
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