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Attackers reached three PayU cloud servers, used the payout API to add beneficiaries and pushed out 265 unauthorised transfers to 156 bank accounts.
Summary
The first arrests are not hackers but two men who rented out a bank account. What happened Gurugram Cyber Crime Police have arrested two residents of Ludhiana, Punjab, in a case where payment aggregator PayU lost about Rs 25.67 crore. According to MediaNama, attackers gained access to three of the company's cloud servers and manipulated its payout API, the interface a payment aggregator uses to send money out to merchants and other beneficiaries.
They added new beneficiary accounts and moved funds without the company's approval. MediaNama reports 265 unauthorised transactions into 156 bank accounts. PayU's security team noticed unusual API activity at about 11:30 pm on 5 November, and its cloud service provider also flagged suspicious access, but by then the transfers had gone through.
PayU filed its complaint on 9 November. The420.in reports that the FIR invokes Section 318(4) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (cheating). The two men were arrested in Ludhiana on 15 November and remanded to police custody, according to The Pioneer's PTI-based report.
Police say they did not hack anything. One allegedly let his account receive Rs 6.20 lakh of the stolen money for a 2% commission and handed it to the second man, who passed it on to a further handler for another 2%. Police say about Rs 1.5 crore has been frozen so far.
How the attackers first got in is still unknown: police are waiting for an audit report, and The420.in says the compromised credentials could not be identified during detection. PayU had made no public statement at the time of the reports. We covered this in one paragraph in this morning's India Cyber Brief.
This piece looks at the mechanics and the investigation. Why this is not an isolated case On 4 November CERT-In and CSIRT-Fin issued a critical advisory, CIAD-2026-0058, on an AI-assisted threat actor they call CRAFTY FALCON that targets banks, NBFCs, digital lenders, payment aggregators and crypto exchanges. It updates an October advisory (CIAD-2026-0046) on the exploitation of payment and disbursement APIs.
The advisory describes cloud management tools being abused to run commands, internet-facing test and staging systems used as a way into production, tampered mobile apps making API calls the real app never would, and Rs 1 test transfers to confirm a route before large amounts move. It also says attacks were timed for weekends, holidays and low-monitoring hours. MediaNama notes that investigators have not linked the PayU case to that advisory, and we do not either.
In the same week, City Union Bank told the stock exchanges that it found an unauthorised NEFT transfer from a customer account on 16 November and closed the NEFT and RTGS gateway for that account while external experts investigate, according to Elets BFSI. The bank did not disclose the amount or the cause. Analysis: The common thread is that the weak point is no longer a customer's OTP but the machine-to-machine plumbing behind payouts.
Once an attacker can call a payout or settlement API with valid-looking authority, the money leaves at software speed, and the only remaining brake is how fast the receiving accounts can be frozen. How a payout API fraud works Based on the reporting and the CERT-In advisory, the pattern has four stages. We describe them at the level a defender or investigator needs, not as a recipe.
Foothold in the cloud. The attacker obtains some form of access to servers or cloud accounts that can talk to the payout system. CERT-In lists exposed non-production systems, shared credentials and tokens between test and production, and hardcoded secrets as common routes.
Beneficiary manipulation. Instead of stealing card data, the attacker adds new beneficiaries or edits existing ones, so the system itself pays out. In the PayU case, police say new beneficiary accounts were added through commands on the compromised servers.
Rapid fan-out. Money is split across many accounts (156 in the first layer here) so that no single transfer looks large and freezing one account recovers little. Layering through mules.
Account holders rent out their accounts for a small cut, and the money is withdrawn, moved again or converted to crypto. The420.in reports that some account providers were paid as little as Rs 10,000 in cash. Analysis: The first arrests in such cases are almost always at stage 4, because bank KYC leads straight to the account holder.
Reaching the people at stage 1 depends on cloud and API logs, which is why the evidence request matters so much. Red flags Where Indicator Payout and settlement APIs Beneficiaries added or edited outside normal workflows, especially in batches or at night Transactions Rs 1 or other micro test transfers to new beneficiaries followed soon after by large payouts Timing Activity spikes on weekends, public holidays or late at night, as CERT-In describes Cloud audit logs Remote command execution, new access keys or roles, changes to serverless functions in production Test and staging Any connection from a non-production system into production Receiving accounts Newly opened or long-dormant savings accounts suddenly receiving business-sized credits and withdrawing them within hours What to do If you are an ordinary user Never rent, sell or "lend" your bank account, UPI ID or SIM for a commission. The men arrested in this case are accused for exactly that.
Offers dressed up as part-time work or "account verification" jobs are the usual bait. If money you did not expect lands in your account, do not withdraw or forward it. Tell your bank in writing and keep the acknowledgement.
If you lose money to unauthorised transfers, call 1930 or report at cybercrime.gov.in at once. Quick reporting is what makes freezes like the Rs 1.5 crore here possible. If your email or phone number appears in a breach notice from a payments company, check it with IGRS Breach Check and change passwords you have reused elsewhere.
If you are an investigator Report bulk fraudulent transactions to I4C through the Citizen Financial Cyber Fraud Reporting and Management System (CFCFRMS) so that onward layers are flagged across banks, as the CERT-In advisory asks. Send a notice under Section 94 BNSS to the victim company for the payout API logs, beneficiary creation and change logs, admin and service-account login records and cloud provider audit logs for the whole window, not just the day of the transfers. Ask the cloud provider to preserve its logs for the affected accounts quickly; retention periods can be short.
Map the money trail layer by layer from bank statements and KYC of the first-layer accounts. Treat account holders as both suspects and witnesses to reach the handlers above them. For source IP addresses in the API or cloud logs, use IP Lookup to identify the network and VPN and proxy checker to see whether it is a VPN, hosting or anonymising exit.
CERT-In warns that this actor rotates infrastructure within hours to days, so record timestamps carefully. Obtain a Section 63 BSA certificate for every electronic record you rely on, from the company and from banks. Regulated entities that suffer such an incident should report it to CERT-In ([email protected]) within the mandated window, with logs.
If you run a fintech, NBFC or aggregator CERT-In's countermeasures include server-side validation and maker-checker for settlement instructions, cooling periods and velocity rules for new beneficiaries, signed API requests, no shared credentials between test and production, short-lived tokens and secret scanning in code repositories. The420.in reports that the RBI has also asked banks and NBFCs to tighten API and third-party controls, though no circular number has been published yet. Applicable law Provision What it covers Relevance here S.318(4) BNS 2023 (was S.420 IPC) Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property Cited in the FIR, per The420.in S.61 BNS 2023 Criminal conspiracy Links hackers, aggregators and account providers S.317 BNS 2023 Stolen property Receiving or retaining the diverted money S.43 and S.66 IT Act 2000 Unauthorised access and computer-related offences Access to cloud servers and API abuse S.66C IT Act 2000 Fraudulent use of passwords, keys or other unique identifiers If stolen credentials or API keys are established S.70B IT Act and CERT-In Directions, 2022 Mandatory incident reporting Reporting by the affected entity S.94 BNSS 2023 (was S.91 CrPC) Summons to produce documents or records Logs from the company, cloud provider and banks S.106 BNSS 2023 Seizure of property Freezing accounts holding proceeds S.63 BSA 2023 (was S.65B IEA) Admissibility of electronic records Certificate for logs and statements S.8(5) and S.8(6) DPDP Act 2023 Security safeguards and breach intimation Only if personal data was also affected; none has been reported here PMLA 2002, S.3 and S.4 Money laundering Layering of proceeds through mule accounts Analysis: Sections beyond S.318(4) BNS are our reading of what may apply as the investigation develops, not charges reported by police.
What to watch next The audit report on how the servers were breached is the key document still pending. If it shows stolen API credentials or a path from a test environment, the case will fit squarely into the pattern CERT-In has been warning about since October. We will update this page if PayU or the police publish findings.
Sources MediaNama: PayU loses Rs 25.67 crore in alleged cloud server breach; two arrested (19 Nov 2026) The Pioneer: Two held in Ludhiana for breaching PayU's cloud servers, siphoning over Rs 25 crore (18 Nov 2026) The420.in: Rs 25 crore PayU cyber heist, two arrested, 156 beneficiary accounts identified (19 Nov 2026) CERT-In Advisory CIAD-2026-0058: AI-driven attacks on BFSI entities by CRAFTY FALCON (4 Nov 2026) MediaNama: CERT-In flags an AI threat actor targeting BFSI payment APIs (5 Nov 2026) Elets BFSI: City Union Bank flags unauthorised NEFT transfer, shuts gateway (19 Nov 2026) The420.in: RBI asks banks and NBFCs to tighten API security Originally published on IGRS — Intel Grid Research Station. Free OSINT tools and investigation guides for India: igrs.xyz.
KazaSec's take
Incidents like this rarely start with the headline event itself, they usually trace back to an exposed remote-access endpoint, an unpatched perimeter system, or a credential phished weeks earlier. The organizations that recover fastest are the ones that tested their defenses and their incident response plan before they needed them.
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